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Abstract
This dissertation examines if and how technological innovation influences market
structure of the media industry. The empirical focus is twofold: 1) to measure and quantify the
level of ownership concentration and competition (i.e., market structure) of the U.S. media
industry, and 2) to examine the market structure of the media industry as a function of the
adoption of three different media technologies, including television, cable television, and the
Internet. OLS regression analysis is employed to address the following research question: How
do technological innovations affect the market structure of the media industry?
Results of the study provide support for the idea that changes in the adoption rates of
television and cable television lead to changes in the market structure of the media industry. The
study, however, identifies challenges associated with collecting sufficient data to reach solid
conclusions. Finally, the study makes recommendations for future studies that could overcome
these challenges and building upon the findings resulting from this study.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Comcast’s acquisition of NBC in 2011 represented a significant change in the American
media industry. For the first time in the history of the U.S. media, one of the major broadcast
networks in the United States would be owned by one of the largest cable system operators. As
with other large media mergers in the past, the acquisition generated protests and concerns of an
increasing consolidation of power among fewer and fewer media conglomerates (Crawford,
2010). Comparing the acquisition to the AOL—Time Warner merger and other media megamergers, Free Press attorney Corie Wright predicted, “This merger goes deeper and wider than
any of those” (Reybern, 2010). Conversely, proponents such as NBC Chief Executive Jeff
Zucker extolled the virtues of the merger, predicting, “Consumers of all our products—on
screens large and small—will have the benefit of enhanced content and experiences, delivered in
new and better ways” (Finke, 2009).
The arguments leading up to the merger’s eventual FCC approval rekindled an ongoing
discussion regarding media ownership that has endured since the fierce debates of the 1920s
regarding the role and nature of radio broadcasting (McChesney, Telecommunications, mass
media, and democracy: The battle for the control of U.S. broadcasting, 1928-1935, 1993)
(McChesney, 1993). At the heart of this debate is the importance of a free press to a healthy
deliberative democracy (Nichols & McChesney, 2009). Critics of media consolidation point to
the unique role the media plays as an intermediary of diverse ideas and viewpoints, and as a
crucial watchdog of government (Nichols & McChesney, 2009). A central concern in this debate
is the question of whether a highly concentrated media industry is too powerful and not reflective
of (or receptive to) the needs and demands of the general public, instead responding to demands
of the power elites of business, government, and society (Baker, 2007).
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Not all decry the evils of such consolidation (Steiner, 1952; Einstein, 2004). Supporters
of such mergers cite the value of free speech and of a free market unencumbered from
government intervention (Fishman, 2004). Some argue that some consolidation offers media
companies efficiencies that allow them to offer more diverse content that is not always designed
to appeal to mainstream tastes and segments (Steiner, 1952). Moreover, others argue that—even
with current mergers and acquisitions within the industry—the media industry is a highly
competitive and unconcentrated industry (Compaine & Gomery, 2000).
Despite the lack of consensus among some scholars on the desirability of ownership
diversity, it is nonetheless a key concern of federal communications policy. As such,
policymakers are often concerned with whether and how regulatory policy should be crafted to
meet the goals and objectives of media diversity, and ownership diversity in particular. Inherent
in these decisions is the philosophy that specific limitations or restrictions on ownership of media
properties will lead to the type of competition and diversity of ideas, content, and viewpoints that
is desired of a media industry servicing the populous of a democratic society.
However, scholars have highlighted several attempts at regulating media ownership
that—despite good intentions and sound reasoning—proved to be problematic at best and
counterproductive at worst. Such failed attempts include the Financial Syndication and Interest
Rules (Einstein, 2004), the Newspaper-Broadcasting Cross Ownership Rules (Gomery, 2002),
and the Newspaper Preservation Act of 1970 (Martin, 2008).
Given these well-intended but unsuccessful attempts at directly regulating media
ownership, and inasmuch as the media industry does not operate within a vacuum fully and
solely influenced by regulatory action, is it possible that other influences help shape the
competitive landscape of the media industry? If so, identifying these influences—and
understanding how they affect the market structure of the media industry—is crucial to gaining a
2

better understanding of the dynamics of media ownership. Such an understanding may help to
project any changes in the market structure of the media industry resultant from changes in any
of these influences. Moreover, these influences could prove to be more relevant in influencing
the media industry’s market structure, and therefore more potent in creating the kind of
competitive landscape that is desired for a democratic society.
As this dissertation will show, numerous researchers have argued that technological
innovations can lead to changes in the market structure of an industry relying on or adopting
such innovations (Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Dowd, 2004; Blair, 1972). Given the significant
amount of literature supporting this idea, it is appropriate to extend this research by considering
if and how such innovations might specifically influence the market structure of the media
industry.
This dissertation advances the debate on ownership concentration within the media
industry (i.e., market structure) by considering the following research question: How do
technological innovations affect the market structure of the media industry?
This project adds to the existing body of research on the relationship between innovation
and the media market structure in two important ways. First, this study considers the media
industry as whole, rather than examining one particular segment. This approach acknowledges
the importance of convergence within the industry, which continues to break down barriers
between specific media, and now can make a particular medium a practical substitute for another
medium, which previously had not been practical.
Second, this study examines the adoption of specific innovations—television, cable
television, and the Internet—over different periods of time, in order to benefit from a
longitudinal approach as well as to consider the specific adoption trends of each particular
innovation. The different periods of time reflect the different adoption patterns for each of these
3

three innovations. Since the adoption pattern of one innovation will likely differ from that of
another, it is important to be able to capture, measure, and consider these distinctions in order to
gain a better understanding of how, when, and why innovations may influence market structure
of the media industry.
Building upon previous theory, this study considers how innovation influences market
structure of the media industry. In doing so, the study first measures the industry’s market
structure (i.e., ownership concentration) in order to more accurately determine if (and to what
degree) competition within the industry is diminishing. Having established any trend or trends
inherent in the evolution of the market structure of the media industry, this study then looks at
key technological innovations in order to determine if and how these specific innovations
impacted the evolution of the media industry’s market structure.
The study begins by identifying and defining key terms and concepts which will be used
throughout this dissertation. Section A presents and defines these key terms. Specifically,
definitions for these terms are provided within the context of how they are used for this study.
These terms may be defined differently in various other studies or in different contexts. It is
therefore important to clearly distinguish how such terms are used precisely in this study.
Finally, Section B explains the importance and the impact that this study can and should
have, and the anticipated contribution such a study will make to the existing body of research
and literature. As will be discussed in Section B, this contribution will be to advance an
understanding with respect to the relationship between innovation and market structure in
general, and between innovation and media market structure in particular.
A. Defining Key Terms
Included in the above-description of this project are several key terms that have also been
featured frequently and prominently throughout previous literature; however, definitions of these
4

vary from one researcher to another. As such, it is important to review and clearly define these
terms within the context of this study.
1. Market Structure. For this study, “market structure” reflects the level of competition
within the industry, and takes into account both the number of firms and the distribution of
revenues among these firms. This is consistent with the approach taken by researchers such as
Albarran and Dimmick (1996) and Compaine and Gomery (2000).
Market structures can be defined based on the number of firms within the particular
industry, the product offered by firms within the industry, or a combination of both
(Chacholiades, 1986). Media economists, for example, have measured competition (or “market
structure”) of specific segments (e.g., product offerings) within the U.S. media industry such as
television (Howard, 1998), radio (Drushel, 1998), film (Gomery, 1984), and book publishing
(Greco, 2000). Alternatively, Alexander (1994) assessed the market structure of the music
recording industry by also considering the number of firms competing against each other.
Microeconomists generally assess a market’s structure within the context of the level of
competition for that market (Baird, 1975). In these cases, market structures are classified within
the spectrum of “perfect competition” and “monopoly” (p. 100). Market structures often reflect
the competitive level of the firms within the industry as well, typically measured by considering
each company’s market share—based on its revenues—within the industry being studied
(Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Compaine and Gomery, 2000).
Other researchers have relied on different taxonomies of “market structure” in order to
answer specific research questions. Emmons and Prager (1997), for example, in studying the
cable television industry, defined market structures based on ownership (private vs. non-private,
or governmental). Similarly, Dunaway (2008), when considering influences on the quality of
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campaign new coverage, examined differences between corporate owned and privately held
media firms.
In this study, a highly concentrated market structure indicates a media industry that
features few companies with large market shares exerting great influence over all competitors in
the industry. Conversely, a highly competitive market structure indicates many companies
aggressively competing for customers and revenues without any company enjoying a significant
level of market power, as measured by the company’s market share of the industry. This study
may discuss the market structure of the media industry relative to “media concentration” or
“ownership concentration” as well. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two
through Five, these terms have been used by different researchers in different ways. Unless
otherwise stated, the terms “media concentration” and “ownership concentration” in this study
will relate to the market structure of the industry, as defined in this section.
2. Innovation. The review of previous studies in Chapter Two offers a deeper
explanation of the different approaches that researchers have taken in defining and
operationalizing the concept of “innovation” when seeking to establish a relationship between
innovation and market structure. One approach has been to examine a specific technological
innovation in order to see if and how it affected the structure of a particular market or industry
(Alexander, 1994; Hannan & McDowell, 1990). Abernathy and Utterback (1978) argue that
innovations can be both radical and incremental. Radical innovations generally impact the
production process of cost structure within an industry, and often lead to new industries. This
study will follow this approach and specifically will examine radical innovations that
significantly changed the media industry. Three innovations—television, cable television, and
the Internet—will each be studied because each has been viewed as a new medium of mass
communication (Hilliard & Keith, 2010; James, 1983; Morris & Morgan, 2002).
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3. Media Industry. For the purpose of this study, “the media industry” will be defined
to include any company in the business of creating, distributing, or owning news, entertainment,
or informational content for consumption by mass audiences. This definition closely mirrors that
used by Compaine and Gomery (2000). However, those researchers also included
telecommunications companies engaged in what has traditionally been viewed as interpersonal
(i.e., one-to-one) communications such as local and long distance telephone service providers.
This study does not consider such services to be mass communication, and will, therefore not be
included as part of the media industry.
Likewise, the definition used in this study is similar to how Albarran and Dimmick
(1996) defined the media industry. In their study, the research team included fourteen different
sectors as classified by Veronis, Suhler and Associates in their annual Communications Industry
Report. Their approach, however, includes sectors such as advertising agencies and some
miscellaneous communications services such as specialty marketing services that would not
necessarily be consistent with this study’s definition of media industry. Such firms are not
included in this study when considering the media industry.
The media industry examined in this study is used to describe media operations
specifically within the United States. This may include companies headquartered outside of the
United States; in such a case only revenues recognized as being generated in the United States
will be included when determining the size of the media industry and appropriate market shares.
Likewise, revenues generated by foreign operations of U.S.-based companies will not be
considered in this study.
B. Impact of This Study
This study is important because the findings it generates can provide value in several
areas. First, academic researchers have examined the relationship between innovation and
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market share within the context of other industries (Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Hannan &
McDowell, 1990; Mansfield, 1983). This study extends the existing body of research to include a
specific study of the U.S. media industry as a whole. To be sure, some researchers have
examined the effect of innovation on market structure of the media, but these studies have
focused on a particular segment of the media industry (Alexander, 1994; Dowd, 2004; Peterson
& Berger, 1975). As horizontal integration becomes more prevalent within the media industry,
and media conglomerates respond to convergence trends within the industry, the need to examine
the market structure of the media industry as a whole instead of by individual segment becomes
more relevant (Compaine & Gomery, 2000). As such, the need arises to also consider the effect
of innovation on the media industry as a whole.
Secondly, while some studies have examined specific innovations, none have considered
the adoption rate of these innovations when attempting to determine the effect of such an
innovation on market structure, even though the adoption of such an innovation is obviously
required for it to have an effect on market structure (Silverberg, Dosi, & Orsenigo; 1988).
Researchers may identify an effect that innovation has on an industry’s market structure, but
cannot fully and accurately explain or quantify the nature of this cause-and-effect relationship,
since the adoption pattern of the innovation isn’t considered.
Researchers have found a frequent pattern in the adoption of a new innovation, whether it
be information, knowledge, or a physical product (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943).
Frequently, a new innovation is adopted by a small group of “early adopters,” followed by rapid
adoption by a larger segment of the population, with subsequent slower adoption and, finally, a
“negative growth” phase, where individuals begin to replace the innovation with a newer idea or
product (Levitt, 1965). This pattern is often referred to and depicted as an “adoption curve,”
reflecting the S-shaped trend of the adoption rates when graphically presented (Silverberg, Dosi,
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& Orsenigo, 1988). To effectively measure whether and how a specific innovation affects market
structure, a longitudinal approach should be considered to effectively capture the adoption
pattern of the innovation, as measured over the time of that innovation’s adoption. Dowd (2004)
utilized a time series approach to measure the effect of specific innovations on the music
industry, but the study was more focused on the number of performing acts and the number of
recording firms, rather than on the market structure, which considers market strength of each
firm.
Lastly, this study is also important because of the impact such findings could have on
policymaking endeavors. If, for example, innovation is found to have a causal effect on the
market structure of the media, one of the outcomes of this study will be to identify, measure and
explain this causal relationship. In so doing, the influence of innovation on the market structure
of the media should be considered when formulating any future policy related to media
ownership in order to ensure the greatest possibility for effective regulation that achieves its
desired objective without generating unanticipated consequences as well.
On the other hand, if this study concludes that there is no causal relationship between
innovation and media market structure, it will show a contradiction to much of the previous
economic literature arguing such a relationship (Blair, 1972; Klepper & Graddy, 1990). Future
studies would be warranted in order to better understand why the innovation-to-market-structure
relationship is evident in some industries but not the media industry. If, indeed, this study shows
no causal relationship between innovation and market structure, then future studies should focus
on better understanding and identifying those variables that actually do influence the market
structure of the media industry.
This study, then, uses a measurement of ownership concentration to quantify the market
structure of the media industry. Doing so will reveal any trends towards increased competition
9

(or, conversely, increased concentration) over the timeframe of the study—1950-2009. Finally,
this study measures the adoption rates of three specific mass communication technologies—
television, cable television, and the Internet—and looks for the presence of causal relationships
between the adoption of these three new technologies and the market structure of the media
industry. In so doing, this study seeks to develop a model that can serve as the basis of future
studies that are designed to further explain how innovation as well as other influences may
impact the market structure of the media.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Scholars seeking to explain the nature of the relationship between innovation and market
structure have taken varied approaches (Alexander, 1994; Blair, 1972; Dowd, 2004; Geroski &
Pomroy, 1990; Mansfield, 1983; Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1950). In fact, there is not a
generally accepted principle as to which (if either) influences the other: Some argue that
technological innovations act as catalysts or shocks to an industry, resulting in a shake-up that
affects the market structure (Alexander, 1994; Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Klepper & Graddy,
1990); others argue that market structure and firm size within a market stimulate innovative
activity and ultimately technological innovation (Aghion & Griffith, 2005; Dowd, 2004;
Schumpeter, 1950; Van Cayseele, 1998). Both of these approaches are examined in Sections A
and B of this chapter.
For many theorists espousing the idea presented in Section A that innovation influences
market structure, the diffusion of these influences is an important element in understanding how
market structure is affected. Section C reviews previous studies that have attempted to identify
and measure such a relationship specifically within the media industry (Audretsch, 1995;
Mansfield, 1983; Peterson & Berger, 1975).
A. The Effect of Innovation on Market Structure
Innovation is one of many exogenous influences that affect market structure (Klepper &
Graddy, 1990). Tushman and Anderson see such innovations as “technological
discontinuities”—significant breakthroughs or shocks to an otherwise gradual evolution of
innovation that “either enhance or destroy the competence of firms in an industry” (p. 439,
1986). While the introduction of any innovation may be viewed as a one-time shock to an
industry, some researchers view the effects of the innovation as a longitudinal process with its
11

own evolutionary characteristics (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
1971; Schumpeter, 1950). In many instances, such an evolutionary process takes on the
characteristics of an S-shaped diffusion curve (Silverberg, Dosi, & Orsenigo; 1988). The
diffusion curve illustrates the rate at which an idea or innovation is accepted by a particular
population. As Pemberton (1937) explained, “The distribution of a population according to time
of adoption . . . tends to follow the normal frequency form and the curve of diffusion is the
cumulative expression of this distribution” (p. 55).
The theoretical explanation to adoption patterns described by Rogers (1962) is prevalent
in much of the literature supporting the idea that the adoption, not just the introduction, of an
innovation is an important factor in measuring its effect on market structure (Silverberg, et al.,
1988). The idea of an S-shaped pattern of diffusion is also used to explain how industries and
individual products can evolve over time. In such cases, the “Industry life cycle” or “Product life
cycle” reflects differing rates of adoption over time (Klepper, 1996; Mazzucato, 2000). Both
Rogers’ Diffusion of Innovations theory and the Industry Life Cycle theory will be discussed in
greater detail.
Whether an adoption pattern follows the traditional diffusion curve pattern or one unique
to a particular innovation, such concepts are used to help explain how and why certain industries
develop in response to technological changes. Berger (2003) has shown that in the banking
industry larger banks tend to implement new technologies sooner than smaller banks, while
Dowd (2004) has shown that production technologies have helped create a more open,
decentralized recording market with multiple, competing production companies, even though
many of these companies are merely divisions of the same conglomerate holding company.
In Economic Concentration, Blair (1972) examined causes and effects of market
concentration from an empirical perspective, synthesizing years of prior research from academic
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as well as governmental initiatives.1 As part of this examination, he considered the effect of
innovation on market structure, and found a concentrating effect until the early 20th century.
During this time, technological innovation generally resulted in advances that encouraged
economies of scale, but also required significant investment to take advantage of these advances.
As a result, companies were driven to follow a bigger-is-better strategy; industries consolidated
either through mergers, attrition of smaller, weaker competitors, or a combination of both.
By the late 20th century, however, Blair observed that new technological advances tended
to be less costly, either in terms of the initial investment or in terms of the economies of scale
required to justify such investments. Some researchers refer to the Blair hypothesis as the idea
that—at least since World War II—new technology and innovation has had a decentralizing
effect on market structure (Geroski & Pomroy, 1990; Mansfield, 1983).
Mansfield (1983) examined the chemical, petroleum, and steel industries to see what kind
of effect innovations from 1920-1982 had on these industries. Mansfield found that in many
cases an industry became more concentrated after the introduction of new technology, but that
the presence of such concentration “depends on the nature and sources of the new technology”
(p. 209). Mansfield acknowledged that one limitation to existing models of innovation and
market structure is the assumption that no new firms enter an industry during the introduction
and diffusion of a technological change. Noting that such new-firm entry had occurred in the
drug and chemical industries, Mansfield speculated that—in such cases—innovation may
generate greater competition and actually reduce market concentration, not increase it.
Geroski and Pomroy (1990) used data from two cross-sectional panels to measure the
effect of innovations on the market structure of 73 different “technologically progressive

Blair’s work was primarily based on 44 volumes of transcripts of selected hearings before and reports of the
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee during the years 1957—1971.
1
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industries” in the United Kingdom (p. 305). The researchers’ findings were supportive of the
Blair hypothesis: Regression results showed innovation generated a negative effect on industry
concentration, although the effect size was small. In other words, innovation led to reduced
industry concentration, or, conversely, increased competition. The researchers also found that
industry deconcentration was generally felt relatively quickly after the introduction of the
innovation. Moreover, for the industries studied, the decrease in market concentration was offset
by increases in the industry size and in capital intensity.
Given the substantial body of work supporting the effect of market structure on
innovation and, conversely, of innovation on market structure, how can these two seemingly
contradictory theoretical approaches be reconciled? Geroski and Pomroy (1990) argue that
different findings are not contradictory, but rather complementary, positing that such different
findings “point to a mutually reinforcing process in which innovations deconcentrate markets,
and such deconcentration further stimulates innovative activity (ceteris paribus)” (p.312). Either
aspect of this process deserves close examination: Mansfield (1983) as well as Geroski and
Pomroy (1990) show that either aspect of the process can be studied independent of the other.
This study, therefore, focuses on the idea that innovation influences market structure, while
recognizing that the resulting market structure can subsequently influence further innovation.
B. The Effect of Market Structure on Innovation
In examining market structure as an influencing variable on innovation and innovative
activity, many scholars argue that differences between individual firms within a market can
influence the respective level of innovative activity that each undertakes (Griliches, 1957;
Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross, 1943). Firms may be spurred to greater innovative activity by the
potential for additional profitability or by the threat of losses due to a competitor’s innovative
activity. On the other hand, while other firms—currently enjoying a dominant position within the
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market—may be discouraged from innovative activity if such activity may result in new products
that take away from their existing mix of profit-generating products and offerings (Kamien &
Schwartz, 1969; Van Cayseele, 1998). Such approaches, however, view a firm’s investments in
research and development as a measurement of innovation. This can be problematic because
investments do not always translate to innovation; investing in innovation (i.e., research and
development) entails a risk that those investments may result in no meaningful innovations
(Smith & Hall, 2012).
Others have considered the relative size of an individual firm as a major determinant of
innovation. Some theorists argue that larger firms are more able and willing to generate
innovation (Schumpeter J. , 1950), while others believe that larger firms dominating a particular
market will have little or no incentive to engage in meaningful innovative activity (Dowd, 2004).
In an attempt to reconcile these two schools of thought, Achs and Audretsch rely on a “modified
Schumpeterian hypothesis that the relative innovative advantage of large and small firms is
determined by the extent to which a market is characterized by imperfect competition” (p. 573,
1987). In this case large firms operating within markets having significant barriers to entry
would be more willing and able to innovate. Conversely, small firms would be more motivated
to innovate in more competitive markets with lowers barriers to entry. Others argue that smaller
firms also have an advantage to innovate when such innovations offer significant breakthroughs,
as opposed to those more incremental in nature (Mazzucato, 2000).
C. Examining Innovation’s Effect on Market Structure within the Media Industry
While prior studies examining the relationship between innovation and market structure
in general may provide some insight into the effect of innovation on the market structure of the
media industry, many researchers acknowledge that such a relationship varies significantly from
one industry to another (Audretsch, 1995; Mansfield, 1983). As such, it is important to consider
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existing research that has examined the effect of innovation specifically on the market structure
of the media industry.
The relative concentration of the media industry is important for reasons. To be sure, the
media industry—like any other industry—should be characterized by a healthy level of
competition, offering consumers a diversity of choices differentiated by pricing and product
offerings. However, the media industry is unique because of its importance to providing a
democratic society with information and a variety of perspectives to as many people as possible
(Fishman, 2004). While the media industry is examined in many different ways, an ownershipbased approach is crucial; Gomery argues that “No research in mass communication can ignore
questions of mass media ownership and the economic implications of that control” (p. 507,
Compaine & Gomery, 2000).
Compaine and Hoag (2012) provide evidence that innovation has a positive effect on the
competitive landscape of the media industry. In a series of interviews with 30 media
entrepreneurs, the researchers concluded that one of the main sources of support for the entry of
new competitors in the media industry was “the critical role of technological innovation” (p. 34).
To be sure, new entry does not automatically ensure increased competition: Start-up ventures can
enter a market but quickly fail and exit without offering any meaningful competition or
significant impact on the market structure of the industry. Accordingly, if technological
innovation supports entrepreneurs desiring to enter a new market or industry, does such new-firm
entry ultimately affect the market structure (e.g., increased competition)?
Peterson and Berger (1975) examined the market concentration of the music industry
segment of the media industry over a 26 year period. The primary research question considered
the music segment’s market structure as an independent variable. However, part of the study
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was also designed to see how the variables—including market structure—changed during the 26
years.
The researchers found a “concentration-competition cycle” (p. 158) during the 26 year
period; the industry experienced three periods of rising corporate concentration interrupted by
two periods of high competition. The shifts from concentration to competition (and vice versa)
were often precipitated by other events or influences. In particular, Peterson and Berger note
that the first shift—from concentration to competition in the mid-1950s—saw the expansion of
more music production companies. In the second half of this decade, the number of production
companies achieving a hit on Billboard magazine tripled. Peterson and Berger partly explain
this shift from concentration to competition on technological innovation, specifically the advent
of television.
According to Peterson and Berger, this new medium of television influenced both the
motion picture and radio industries, which in turn affected the recording industry in two key
ways. First, consumers now had a convenient, in-home alternative to motion pictures, and movie
attendance significantly declined (p. 164). Production companies—looking for new alternatives
to replace this lost revenue—began entering the music recording industry, thereby increasing the
number of competitors.
Secondly, advertisers shifted significant portions of their budgets from radio to television,
forcing radio stations to develop new strategies to combat the fact that audiences were choosing
television over radio for what had been traditional radio programming (e.g., soap operas, comedy
shows, dramatic series). In response, radio stations developed new programming strategies that
incorporated two elements. The first element to the new programming strategy was to rely more
heavily on recorded music. The second element was for radio stations to differentiate
themselves from competing stations by offering differing music formats. The result of this new
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strategy created an environment that supported an expansion of music outlets and a demand for
more music “product,” thereby supporting more music production companies, and hence,
increased competition.
Alexander (1994) also examined the music industry to determine how new technology
led to increased competition and de-concentration as measured by market share. His specific
research objective was to examine the innovation/market structure relationship. His study
offered two important findings. First, Alexander concluded that scale-reducing innovations
positively influenced the level of competition within the music industry, as new entrants to the
industry often drove the innovation, which increased their competitiveness vis-à-vis older, more
established media companies.
Secondly, those innovations leading to increased competition are exogenous in nature.
Alexander found the 100 year period of 1890—1990 featured three periods of high concentration
within the music production industry, and two intervening periods of increased competition.
Both periods of increased competition were triggered by exogenous innovations; the innovations
allowed for improvements in the production processes, which lowered costs, scales of
efficiencies, and facilitated the entry of new start-up production operations.

Further, in both

instances, these periods of increased competition were followed by periods of consolidation, as
competitors merged or struggling companies ceased to exist altogether.
The patterns described by Peterson and Berger as well as Alexander are consistent with
the theoretical concepts of the Industry Life Cycle. Both research teams describe a pattern of
initial introduction followed by a high growth phase with an increasing number of competitors.
Ultimately the industry enters into a consolidation/retraction phase as some companies leave the
industry through merger, failure, or a refocus in their respective corporate missions.
Additionally, Alexander’s finding of two different innovations generating two different periods
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of increased market competition (and subsequent consolidation) is consistent with the idea that
exogenous influences can extend the life of an industry by generating a repeat of the earlier
phases of the Industry Life Cycle.
Other researchers have considered how the market structure influences innovation within
a specific industry such as Dowd’s examination of the music recording industry (2004). In
particular, Dowd examined the U.S. recording industry over a 50-year period to see how
concentration influenced innovation. In this case, his definitions of concentration and innovation
were somewhat different than the definitions being used in this study. Dowd used the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to measure market concentration, but concentration was based on
the number of hit singles produced by a company rather than revenues. Additionally, Dowd
operationalized innovation based on the number of new acts and the number of new firms that
were included on the list of hit singles.
Studies of innovation’s effect on the media industry in particular have typically focused
on a particular segment, rather than the media as a whole (Alexander, 1994; Dowd, 2004;
Peterson & Berger, 1975). More recently, a few scholars have begun measuring the market
structure of the media as a whole (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Compaine & Gomery, 2000).
This work has not yet been extended to examine the effect that technological innovation may
have on market structure.
The existing literature, therefore, provides a foundation for additional research questions
and hypotheses. Compaine and Gomery (2000) have studied the market structure of the media
industry at two distinct points in time—1986 and 1997. Extending this study to incorporate
multiple years would capture any trends or countertrends that may provide a more intuitive
understanding of the dynamics of the media industry during the second half of the 20th century
and beyond. Such trends are consistent with those identified by Peterson and Berger (1975) in
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their study of the music industry, which has experienced phases of ownership concentration,
followed by phases of de-concentration, in part spurred by new technological innovation.
In addition to measuring any trends related the market structure of the media industry
over time, a second question to explore is whether or not technological innovation—particularly
radical innovation—affects these trends. The literature reviewed in this chapter clearly supports
such a hypothesis; studies involving other industries (Hannan & McDowell, 1990) as well as
specific segments within the media industry (Alexander, 1994; Peterson & Berger, 1975) find
that innovation affects the market structure of the media industry, albeit in different ways.
However, without having longitudinal data on the market structure of the media, it has not been
possible to confirm such a relationship between the media industry market structure and
innovation.
Finally, if the expected causal relationship is established between radical technological
innovation and media market structure, such a finding would suggest the need to examine the
nature and extent of this causal influence. Again, Peterson and Berger (1975) may provide some
clues as to the nature of this influence: Their findings seem to indicate that technological
innovation initially generates a period of market expansion (i.e., de-concentration) but, as the
innovation matures in the marketplace, such market expansion curtails and is eventually replaced
by a period of market consolidation (i.e., concentration).
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Chapter Three
Theoretical Argument
The literature reviewed in Chapter Two provides strong empirical support for the
argument that innovation has a positive effect on a competitive market structure. There is a
significant body of theoretical work that supports this argument as well.
As noted in the previous chapter, Peterson and Berger (1975) make a compelling
argument that as an innovation matures in the marketplace, the innovation’s influence on a
competitive market structure diminishes, creating the potential for a reconsolidation and a more
concentrated market structure of a particular industry. Despite Peterson and Berger’s
observations, tying an innovation’s effect specifically to its adoption rate has not been widely
attempted. The importance and significance of an innovation’s adoption pattern is heavily
grounded in the theory of Diffusion of Innovations. Section A discusses the general theory of
Diffusion of Innovations, as well as the specific application within the business environment as
explained by the Industry Life Cycle.
Scholars of the relationship between innovation and market structure generally
acknowledge Joseph Schumpeter and his work to be a critical foundation for such studies
(Freeman, 1982; Langlois, 2002). Schumpeter’s theoretical perspective is particularly interesting
because his arguments evolved over time, resulting in what some consider to be a dichotomy of
conflicting viewpoints. Section B reviews Schumpeter’s work and evolution from one school of
thought to the other as a means of contrasting and comparing the theories developed in the
previous chapter.
Lastly, Section C examines more closely the idea of radical and incremental innovations,
particularly from a theoretical perspective to illustrate how such innovations could impact the
market structure of the media industry.
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A. Industry Life Cycles and the Impact of Adoption Curves
In his retrospective on factors that led to his developing the diffusion of innovations
theory (and the subsequent growth in its applicability and usage), Rogers (2004) explained that it
was his interest in developing a more “generaliz(ed) model of diffusion” (p. 16) that led him to
publish Diffusion of Innovations. As part of his argument for a general diffusion model, Rogers
offered a model of the Innovation-Decision Process as well as a method of classifying adoption
categories consistent with the S-shaped curve of cumulative adoption and the bell-shaped curve
of adoption patterns over time as previously utilized in studies (Rogers, 1962; Ryan & Gross,
1943). To be sure, these categories were not new to the study of diffusion, but Rogers’ work
helped to set a standard with them.
Building upon this understanding of how ideas are “diffused” into society, researchers
have utilized the Product Life Cycle as a means of understanding how new products are
introduced and accepted into the marketplace (Dean, 1950; Levitt, 1965; Chandrasekaran &
Tellis, 2011). This literature and the literature on the adoption of innovations suggest that: 1)
adoption rates can vary, and 2) these variable patterns of adoption may have differential
influences on market structures.
In a revised look at the product life cycle, Andrews (1975) suggests that the life cycle can
be extended by revitalizing an already established product. Such revitalization can come from
product redesigns, new markets, or new applications for the product, among other strategies.
The result is either an extension or prolonged effect of the maturity stage of life cycle, or a
possible renewal of the cycle itself, whereby the renewed product returns to the introduction or
growth stage. Figure 1 illustrates both hypothetical scenarios.
The previously-discussed study by Alexander (1994) is an example of such a renewal of
the life cycle. In his study, Alexander found that developments such as production
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improvements could lead to the revitalization of a product, and extend the current stage or renew
the life cycle by reverting back to an earlier growth phase.

Traditional Product
Life Cycle
Extended Product Life
Cycle
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7

9

11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Time

Renewed Product Life
Cycle

Figure 1. Comparison of Product Life Cycles. (A comparison of three different
product lifecycles, which illustrates the differences in the degree of adoption or
acceptance of a product.)
Building upon this idea, researchers such as Abernathy and Utterback have posited an
industry life cycle theory (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975; Abernathy & Utterback, 1978). In this
model, the unit of analysis is not the firm, but rather the production process (Peltoniemi, 2009).
The industry life cycle is influenced by both radical and incremental innovations (Abernathy &
Utterback, 1978). Radical innovations tend to focus on enhancing performance and filling needs
that heretofore have not been satisfied by existing product offerings within the industry. On the
other hand, incremental innovations generally impact the production processes and/or cost
structure within an industry. Radical innovations are usually the catalyst for new industries,
whereas incremental innovations are typically more evident as an industry matures (Abernathy,
1978).
Gort and Klepper (1982) conclude that new technologies—like those termed “radical
innovations” by Abernathy and Utterback—positively influence the growth of an industry
because such innovations encourage the entry of new competitors and help to delay the
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elimination of existing and less efficient competitors. Gort and Klepper suggest that later in the
cycle these less efficient competitors exit the industry, driven by “intensified technological
competition originating from sources internal to the industry” (p. 650). This description of
internally-generated technological advances is consistent with Abernathy and Utterback’s
“incremental innovations.” Gort and Klepper’s description of firm entry and firm exit support
the idea that adoption rates for radical innovations initially propel more competitors capitalizing
on these innovations, followed by a decline as the rate of adoption also declines.
Gort and Klepper’s characterization of incremental innovations as “originating from
sources internal to the industry” (p. 650) introduces the idea that innovations can be either
endogenous or exogenous (Alexander, 1994; Brouwer, van Dalen, Roelandt, Ruiter, & van der
Wiel, 2004). In their review of previous research on market structure and innovation, Brouwer,
et al. concluded: “Market structure and the degree of competition change as a result of
(individual) firm’s innovation decision. And the changed market structure . . . changes the
character of competition as well as the competitive pressure to innovate (“endogeneity
problem”)” (p. 203, 2004). Moreover, firms often make the strategic decision to compete
through increased product innovation instead of through pricing. Generally (though not always)
such product innovations could be considered as “incremental innovations” that are
incrementally improving the functionality or attractiveness of a particular product or service.
In his examination of the changes in the market structure of the recording industry,
Alexander observes the opposite: “Although one might expect significant new technologies to be
endogenous (and hence proprietary), several important technological innovations in the music
recording industry were, in fact, largely exogenous” (p. 114, 1994).
Evans and Schmalensee (2002) attempt to explain these differences by explaining that
some companies in some industries engage in “dynamic . . . for the market (competition) through
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. . . winner-take-all races to produce drastic innovations, rather than through static price/output
competition in the market” (p. 2). Such “output competition” would clearly include incremental
innovations designed to improve or enhance specific aspects of a product or service. Conversely,
“drastic innovations”—which Evans and Schmalensee argue are prevalent in high-technology
industries—have a radical impact on the existing industry, often resulting in “creative
destruction,” a term offered by Schumpeter (1950) to describe how innovation can destroy
existing, established industries or companies and create new ones (p. 81).
B. Schumpeter Theory
The idea of creative destruction is a foundational tenet of the work of Joseph Schumpeter,
who showed that the evolutionary nature of capitalism is influenced by innovation, whether it is
manifested in the form of products, production methods, markets, or organizations (1950). As
innovation brings about improved products and processes, it also weakens and destroys those
well-entrenched organizations that had succeeded by relying on products and processes now
made obsolete by the latest innovations. As Scherer (1992) explained, “Innovation . . . destroyed
old monopolies while creating new economic value” (p. 1418). This process of destroying
market leaders and replacing them with new ones is the heart of Schumpeter’s creative
destruction.
The nature of this innovation, however, has been explained by Schumpeter with
sometimes different and conflicting rationales (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1950). In his
early work, The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1934) champions the
entrepreneur as the agent of this innovation. It would be the entrepreneur—either as an
individual or small business—through innovation, that would challenge established market
leaders and usher in a new round of creative destruction. By 1950, however, Schumpeter seemed
to offer a different view, positing in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, that it was the large,
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established firm—with its greater capacity for investment—that was able to effectively spur new
innovation (1950). Moreover, the large firm’s incentive to invest in new innovation came from a
desire to further dominate an existing market, hence, such innovation tended to have the effect of
increasing concentration within a market or industry.
Researchers have subsequently argued on behalf of either of these two philosophies—
dubbed by many as “Schumpeter I” and “Schumpeter II” (Freeman, 1982; Langlois, 2002).
Relying on a series of simulation experiments within a hypothetical 16-firm industry, Nelson and
Winter (1978) attempted to identify those variables that facilitated concentration within the
industry. The researchers concluded that investment in new innovative technologies results in an
increasingly concentrated market, as “Some firms track emerging technological opportunities
with greater success than other firms; the former tend to prosper and grow; the latter to suffer
losses and decline” (p. 542). Such a conclusion would generally support the Schumpeter II idea
that larger firms, not smaller firms, are the real agents of innovation.
On the other hand, Geroski (1990) found that increased innovation within an industry led
to reduced concentration. In such a case, smaller, entrepreneurial entities—as referred to by
Schumpeter in The Theory of Economic Development (1934) (“Schumpeter I”)—would likely be
the agents of change and the catalyst for creative destruction. Rather than utilizing simulation
techniques, Geroski relied on data of actual technological advances by industry over a 10-year
period.
Hospers (2005) notes that Schumpeter “has long inspired social scientists and their
research . . . (but has) not engendered an unambiguous interpretation of his ideas” (p. 25), while
Scherer (1992) simply summarizes the debate by saying, “The only simple conclusion stemming
from . . . theoretical research stimulated by Schumpeter . . . is that the links between market
structure, innovation, and economic welfare are extremely complex” (p. 1421). This complexity
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supports a research approach that seeks to examine innovation and market structure within a
specific context (e.g., industry).
C. A Theoretical Application of Radical and Incremental Innovation
The existing literature features different approaches to explaining how differences in
innovations (e.g., radical vs. incremental, endogenous vs. exogenous) may influence market
structures. While the different approaches are not necessarily contradictory, it is not well
established that they are complementary, either. This study does not seek to explain these
differences; however, it is anticipated that the results of this study will provide a foundation for a
framework that can be used to develop a thorough explanation of the dynamics between radical
and incremental innovation. Specifically, theory suggests that radical innovations lead to a
“creative destruction” where new competitors challenge—and often replace—old industry
leaders. Eventually, an industry stabilizes and shifts in market structure tend to be minimal, often
within a small group of competitors within the overall industry. Those smaller shifts reflect the
ongoing efforts price/output competition, often considered incremental innovation. Figure 2
illustrates a hypothetical scenario, where an industry over time feels the effect of the adoption of
two different radical innovations by the marketplace, including an expanded market structure and
increased competitive levels.
Over time, as the adoption of either innovation decreases, the market structure may
consolidate or maintain some sense of equilibrium, although an individual competitor within the
industry may gain or lose market power vis-à-vis other competitors. This study will provide
insight on the effect of radical innovations on the market structure of the media industry. The
hypothesized trend in Figure 2 suggests that radical innovations—rather than creating a single
concentrating or deconcentrating effect on market structure—generates a market expansion in
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reaction to rising adoption trends of the innovation, and a subsequent market consolidation as the
adoption rate weakens.
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Figure 2. Theoretical Trend, Innovation-to-Concentration. (An illustration of
the hypothesized relationship between the adoption rate of an innovation and
the market concentration of an affected industry.)
This hypothesized trend also suggests that incremental innovations may be more
prevalent during periods where market structures are relatively stable, as companies seek to gain
competitive advantages over others in the industry with their own innovation. Such a situation
may actually show that innovation (particularly incremental innovation) can in fact influence the
market structure of the industry. As will be discussed in Chapter Eight, the idea that
endogenous, incremental innovations may be the result of the media industry’s market structure
is a question that warrants further study. However, this study specifically examines radical
innovation, and recognizes that such radical innovations are exogenous shocks to the industry
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that lead to changes in the market structure of the industry. As a result, reverse causality is not a
major concern with this study because the focus of this study is specifically focused on
exogenous influences.
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Chapter Four
Hypotheses
Thus far, the review of previous literature has provided evidence that innovation
influences the market structure of varied industries (Compaine & Hoag, 2012; Geroski &
Pomroy, 1990; Hannan & McDowell, 1990; Mansfield, 1983). In addition, the review indicates
a prevailing concern over the market structure of the media industry; specifically, the concern of
a growing concentrated ownership structure, and the subsequent diminished diversity of ideas
and information resulting from such concentration. The previous research suggests the need to
further examine the relationship between innovation and the market structure of the media. As
with most meaningful research, it also encourages even more questions to consider. This chapter
outlines some of those questions.
Section A reviews the need to quantify the level of market concentration in the media
industry, and to track the trend of such concentration over the last 60 years. Having established
the history of the media market structure for this time frame, it is then possible to examine
specific media innovations (for this study, television, cable television, and the Internet) in order
to see if such innovations had an effect on media market structure. Section B examines the
introduction and adoption of television as a new medium in American society, and the effect it
had on the market structure of the media. Similarly, Sections C and D examine these same
questions, but as they relate to cable television and the Internet respectively.
A. Measuring the Market Structure of the Media
Previous studies of the market structure of the media industry have generally focused on
a specific segment of the industry (Bednarski, 2003; Drushel, 1998; Greco, 2000; Howard, 1998)
as opposed to considering the media industry in its entirety. Researchers have often relied on
this approach because historically, competition in the media industry has often been considered
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segment-specific. For example, notwithstanding differences in programming choices, competing
radio stations can offer listeners (and advertisers) suitable and acceptable alternatives to listeners
wishing to access programming via the radio, or advertisers wishing to reach an audience of
radio listeners. On the other hand, listeners of radio are not likely to consider magazines and
their content as acceptable alternatives to radio programming. This substitutability logic has
been the basis of examining market structures in a segment-specific manner.
1. Studying Media Market Structure by Segment. Howard (1998) sought to determine
if implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”), which relaxed
ownership restrictions throughout the entire media industry, affected ownership diversity among
television stations. While ownership consolidation had been evident for over two decades within
the television industry, Howard found that passage of the 1996 Act brought a noticeable and
marked increase in consolidation of ownership. However, he also concluded that despite this
increased consolidation, ownership diversity was still quite apparent within the television
industry, as reflected by more than 184 group owners and the continuation of many local owners.
Bednarski also examined the effects of the 1996 Act, focusing on ownership of radio
stations (2003). She found a 25% decrease in the number of radio station owners during the five
years immediately following passage of the 1996 Act. Similarly, Drushel—also studying the
effects of the 1996 Act on the radio industry—observed a 100% increase in concentration levels
of ownership between the years 1992 and 1997, thus offering a comparison of radio ownership
before and after implementation of the 1996 Act (1998). Finally, Chambers (2001) examined the
effect of the 1996 Act on radio ownership within markets with populations of less than 125,000.
Again, the result was a decrease in ownership diversity.
In another study, Greco concluded the U.S. consumer book industry for the years 1995
and 1996 was “moderately concentrated,” as defined by industry accepted standards (2000).
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Despite significant merger activity among book publishers during this time, ownership
concentration actually decreased. Greco reasoned the increase reflected the fact that smaller
publishers, capitalizing on industry turmoil resulting from larger firms merging and
consolidation operations, were able to expand through internal growth instead of through
acquisitions.
2. Studying Market Structure of the “Media as a Whole.” As media companies
continue to merge to converge, the argument for studying media ownership across all segments
becomes more compelling (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996, Compaine & Gomery, 2000). This
argument reflects the ongoing convergence of multiple media platforms into fewer but more
robust and flexible platforms that allow similar content to easily be distributed in many different
ways (Jenkins, 2008). One of the results of such convergence is greater substitutability among
(not just within) different medium formats. Thierer (2005) posits that such substitutability can
vary in degrees but generate competition among media companies that previously might not have
been viewed as competitors. He points out that “rapid technological convergence has made it
increasingly difficult to distinguish one type of media outlet from another” (p. 40).
Albarran and Dimmick (1996) measured ownership concentration levels within several
media industry segments, but also “across-industry concentration” among the top four and top
eight media companies in 1994. The researchers relied on existing concentration ratios that have
been previously used to measure media concentration (Chan-Olmsted & Litman, 1988; Owen,
Beebe, & Manning, 1974; Picard, 1988). Using these ratios, the researchers found high
ownership concentration in specific segments, but found that “in terms of total industry revenues
the communication industries as a whole have not yet reached levels indicating high
concentration” (p. 48, Albarran & Dimmick, 1996).
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Noam (2009) examined ownership concentration across the entire mass media industry
but also measured concentration across all content programming (i.e., providers) and content
distribution (i.e., deliverers). Noam measured key points in time during the 1984—2005
timeframe. Regarding horizontal concentration, he found concentration among content providers
had slightly increased during the time studied, but had stayed at concentrated levels throughout
the entire period. Among content distributors, concentration increased dramatically from 19922005, but, as with content providers, the level of concentration was consistently within
“unconcentrated” levels.
To measure ownership concentration across the entire mass media industry, Noam
considered a firm’s presence across all media sectors, represented by a Sector Share Index. He
found concentration increased over the 1984-2005 timeframe, particularly among the largest
companies. During this timeframe, the share of the mass media industry held by the top ten firms
doubled from 17.7% to 35.5%. He also considered the relative strength of vertically integrated
firms, recognizing that a vertically integrated firm may benefit from market strength in some—
but not all—segments in which the firm competes. Here, he again found an increasing trend in
concentration among the top 25 firms, most markedly among the top five mass media companies.
Compaine and Gomery reinforced the finding that the media industry as a whole is not
concentrated by comparing ownership concentration at two points in time—1986 and 1997
(Compaine & Gomery, 2000). These two years represent significant milestones within media
regulatory history: The first milestone is shortly after the Federal Communications Commission
eased its ownership rules (F.C.C., 1985). The new rules enacted in 1984 increased the number of
broadcast properties that could be owned by one entity. The second milestone—1997—is the
year after passage of the 1996 Act, which further eased ownership restrictions. Compaine and
Gomery measured ownership concentration among the top four, top eight, and top 50 media
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companies for both years. In all cases, concentration increased from 1986 to 1997, but the
increase was minimal, and the overall measures of concentration were very low, prompting the
researchers to conclude that “the media industry remains one of the most competitive major
industries in U.S. commerce” (p. 562, Compaine & Gomery, 2000).
The Albarran and Dimmick study, while laying a solid foundation for the “media as a
whole” approach, nevertheless lacked two desirable elements. First, the study looked at the
industry for just one year, rather than examining several years, making it impractical to reach
conclusions with a high degree of reliability. Second, the study only considered the top four and
eight companies within the media industry, which can present an incomplete picture of an
industry’s diversity and competitiveness (Albarran & Dimmick, 1996; Owen, Beebe, &
Manning, 1974), raising potential questions of the study’s external validity. Accordingly,
Albarran and Dimmick’s study could be enhanced by incorporating a longitudinal perspective
and by including a greater number of media companies.
Compaine and Gomery’s approach addresses both of these issues, but still leaves room
for further examination (2000). By measuring ownership concentration at two different points in
time, the researchers enhance the temporal aspect of the study. However, the fact that
concentration increased from 1986 to 1997 does not necessarily indicate a consistent upward
trend during that 11-year period. Did media concentration increase in a constant straight line, or
was the increase punctuated with peaks and valleys throughout? Such insight would offer a
greater understanding of trends in media ownership. Compaine and Gomery’s study also offers
greater statistical external validity, as they measured concentration among the top 50 firms.
However, including an even larger sample of companies would present a more complete picture
of media industry market structure.
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Building upon the “media as a whole” concept established by Albarran and Dimmick
(1996) as well as Compaine and Gomery (2000), Vizcarrondo (in press) provides a more
longitudinal perspective of the trends and shifts in the concentration of the media industry.
Using revenue figures for media companies over a 35-year timeframe, Vizcarrondo found—
consistent with the previous studies utilizing the “media as a whole” approach—that the media
industry has been “consistently characterized by unconcentrated and diverse ownership” (in
press).
In addition, Vizcarrondo also noted three distinct trends during the 35-year timeframe: an
initial period of declining concentration within the media industry followed by a period of
general stability and minimal changes from year-to-year, and a final period of rising
concentration. Such changing trends support the idea that a better understanding of how and
why such shifts is warranted. This study then, seeks to understand what causes the market
structure of the media industry to change over a longitudinal period of time by specifically
examining the effect of three different technological innovations which have had a major impact
on the media industry. This study begins by expanding the work of Vizcarrondo to measure the
market structure of the media as a whole over a longer period of time; specifically, the years
1950—2009.
RQ1: How has the market structure of the media industry evolved over time?
B. Television’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry
The invention of the television is not credited to one particular innovator, but rather
viewed as the outcome of many years of innovation by many individuals (Winston, 2003).
Indeed, numerous individuals, businesses and research organizations were independently
working to be the first to develop a working solution to the idea of a mass communication tool
that could broadcast over the airwaves like the radio, but provide the visual element as well.
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With the stock market crash of 1929, many of these fledgling entrepreneurial endeavors lost their
sources of funding, thereby also losing race to be the first to have a working prototype (Godfrey,
2001). The result was a competition between two vastly different men. Philo T. Farnsworth, a
self-made man from the Western U.S. had impressively developed what is believed to be the first
truly working model of a television, while David Sarnoff—a titan in the media industry—had
successfully navigated his way to become President of RCA (Radio Corporation of America) and
therefore had access to significant resources to support an ongoing and aggressive research and
development effort in his quest to be the first to offer a commercially viable television to the
market.
While a few commercial broadcasters were operating in the United States in the early
1930s, two key milestones during the late 30s and early 40s are seen as watershed events in the
early history of television (Edgerton, 2007; Larsen, 1962). The 1939 World’s Fair in New York
City prominently featured the television in the RCA exhibit (Edgerton, 2007). Sarnoff—a
member of the Fair’s executive planning committee—saw the fair as an opportunity to
demonstrate his company’s latest technology. It was, as Edgerton reflects, television’s “comingout party at the RCA exhibit” (p. 6). Just two years later the F.C.C. formally approved
commercial telecasting in the United States, representing what some see as a de facto starting
point for commercial television (Larsen, 1962).
Subsequent to these two milestones, scholars note a rapid adoption of television by U.S.
consumers, and television quickly supplanted radio as the primary medium of information and
entertainment (Fullerton, 1988; Larsen, 1962). These initial years of commercial television did
not necessarily generate an explosion of new companies and new competitors; indeed, the
competition for leadership of this emerging industry seemed to be between Sarnoff’s RCA and
another radio powerhouse—the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)—led by William Paley
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(Edgerton, 2007). However, the FCC—in approving commercial television broadcasting—also
implemented rules designed to eliminate noncompetitive conditions, paving the way for future
entrants into this fledgling new medium. By 1948, the U.S. television industry featured four
networks and 52 stations transmitting programming to nearly one million televisions in 29
different cities (Winston, 2003).
Consistent with Gort and Klepper’s (1982) description of the industry life cycle—which
argues that new technologies initially will positively influence the growth of an industry, but
then later result in the exit of less efficient competitors—this study hypothesizes that the new
technology of television in the 1930s and 1940s had a similar causal effect on the market
structure of the media industry. A positive relationship between the adoption of television and
the market structure of the media industry, therefore, would mean that increases in the adoption
rate of television would lead to an increased level of competition within the media industry.
H1: Changes in the adoption rate of television as a new media innovation should be
inversely related to changes in the market concentration of the media industry.
C. Cable Television’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry
With the advent of television as a viable communications medium for the general public
came an irony: Supporters of this new medium saw this as public good that could provide
benefits to the masses, but the reality was that this new medium was in many ways, strictly for
elites. The cost of a new television was out of reach for most consumers (Television History-The First 75 Years), and, equally important, broadcast signals from television stations could only
reach households within a limited range from the broadcast stations (Mullen, 2008). As such,
this new medium that was hoped to be a way to communicate to the diverse masses throughout
the country was—from a practical standpoint—only broadcasting to those areas within the reach
of a television station’s signal, generally large metropolitan areas.
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Such a difference between the desired and actual effect of television on society created
pressures for new solutions and alternatives that could extend the reach of television’s
broadcasting capabilities. During the second half of the 20th century, the nature and role of cable
television would evolve in response to political, economic, and technological forces (Parsons &
Frieden, 1998). Parsons and Frieden characterize the evolution of cable television as having
three distinct phases.
The first phase—from cable TV’s inception through 1975—saw the medium primarily as
a tool to facilitate the retransmission and distribution of broadcast television to those remote
areas without local broadcast service. The service was known at that time as Community
Antenna television—later Community Access television—or CATV, reflecting the primary
purpose of the medium.2
The second phase—1975-1996—saw “CATV” become “cable television,” as technology
(most notably satellite) helped transform the medium into a major distribution channel for
programming beyond that of retransmitted broadcast stations’ offerings. Pioneers such as TimeLife’s Home Box Office channel (History of HBO) and Ted Turner’s WTCG superstation
(Mullen, 2008)—the forerunner to TBS—utilized the burgeoning technology and changing
regulatory climate to transform cable television into a consumer choice with expanded offerings
that had not been available during the first phase of the medium’s history.
Finally, Parsons and Frieden describe a current, third phase of cable television as a period
of “promoted competition and eliminat(ed) barriers to market entry,” thanks to the combination
of technology (e.g., digital communications) and deregulation (e.g., The Telecommunications
Act of 1996) (p. 20).
2

In an interesting exception to this primary purpose, Parsons and Frieden also point out that early forerunners to
CATV services were developed in large metropolitan areas. Apartment building owners—wishing to prevent the
numerous television antennae arising from their tenants’ individual apartment windows or rooftops—chose instead
to install a master antenna, and retransmit the broadcast signals via wire into each rental unit.

38

The rise of cable television as a pervasive telecommunications medium, therefore, gives
justification to considering its effect on the media industry’s market structure, and its
adoption/growth patterns. It is hypothesized that increases in the adoption rate of cable
television will lead to an increased level of competition within the media industry.
H2: Changes in the adoption rate of cable television as a new media innovation should be
inversely related to changes in the market concentration of the media industry.
D. The Internet’s Influence on Market Structure of the Media Industry
Despite his indications to the contrary, Al Gore did not invent or create the Internet
(Transcript Late Edition, 1999). Rather than an invention, the Internet is really more of a
development over time, gradually formed over the last fifty years. As early as 1961, scientists
began proposing an economically and technologically viable solution enabling remote computers
to connect and transfer information to each other.
Largely motivated by Department of Defense initiatives, this networking functionality
was refined until the first host-to-host protocol—Network Control Protocol—started in 1970
(Zakon, 2003). The networks of computers and their data transfer capabilities were very basic—
some email functionality and a file transfer program. For most of the 1970s and 1980s this
network was used primarily for technical and governmental applications. Even mainstream
businesses were not big users of Internet technology. The communication was very basic during
this time; the Internet was a tool that was only functional in a simple text environment.
Beginning in the late 1980s, five key developments occurred that would change the
landscape of the Internet and transform it into a virtually ubiquitous communications medium.
The first milestone was the development of HTML (Hypertext Markup Language), a
programming language that enabled easier creation and use of computer images, thereby
encouraging visual communication as a practical element of the Internet (Sturken & Cartwright,
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2001). The ability to communicate visually and not just textually in this medium made it more
“user-friendly and more likely to be adopted by mass audiences.
The second development was the creation of the World Wide Web by CERN in 1991. As
a part of the Internet, the “web” (as it has become known) was envisioned as a more accessible
portal for mainstream users and communicators. By 1996, the web would become the service
with the greatest traffic on the Internet (Zakon, 2003).
The third milestone was really more of a trend. From the mid-1990s to today, the
dropping prices for personal computers has made this product more affordable for the average
consumer, and ownership of PCs has grown tremendously (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2000).
Finally, the fourth milestone was the introduction of on-line dial up systems, or Internet
service providers (ISP’s) such as America Online and Prodigy (Zakon, 2005). These providers
delivered Internet accessibility to the average consumer who was often computer
unsophisticated. Prior to these easy-to-use services, most consumers were either too intimidated
or too overwhelmed by the seemingly complex nature of accessing and communicating through
the web.
As consumers became more comfortable with personal computers and accessing the
Internet through CERN’s3 World Wide Web, both users and usage increased significantly
(Abbate, 1999). Quickly, new services went beyond just locating information, but also gave
users—both individuals and companies—the ability to create information, entertainment, and
applications themselves (Schatz & Hardin, 1994). This ability for individuals to create their own
content has ushered in the fifth milestone—Web 2.0—in history of the Internet. Also knows as
the “read/write Web,” this phase of the development of the Internet has given greater power to

3

CERN is an acronym for the European Organization for Nuclear Research, or more literally, the French Conseil
Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire.
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individuals by not only letting them choose what content they see, but also to create and
distribute their own content, effectively bypassing many of the traditional intermediaries (i.e.,
media companies) that have historically been the creators and distributors of such content (Ajjan
& Hartshorne, 2008).
As Ajjan & Hartshorne note, Web 2.0 has “change(d) the way documents are created,
sued, shared and distributed . . . and the increased need for tools to quickly create, analyze and
exchange . . . information . . .(has) fueled a surge in the emergence of Web 2.0 technologies” (p.
71). These technologies yet again are the result of innovation and have introduced a new group
of upstart companies competing with older established media companies to meet the growing
demand for new hardware and software from consumers wishing to capitalize on Web 2.0’s
social media offerings and capabilities.
Given this shake-up in how information is created and disseminated, and the companies
that are engaged in this process, the Internet has become a key area to explore to see what (if
any) impact this new medium has had on ownership diversity. Many see the Internet as yet one
more way for the large, dominant media companies to extend their dominance (McChesney,
1999). Others see an existent or potential increase in diversity as a result of the Internet. Benkler
(2003) argues that the Internet empowers individuals to originate, distribute, and receive
messages without intermediaries (gatekeepers), which has helped create a networked public
sphere that effectively neutralizes any power inherent in a pre-Internet media industry. Indeed,
Benkler argues “The pattern of information flow in such a network is more resistant to the
application of control or influence than was the mass-media model” (p. 261).
Moreover, Benkler provides a detailed analysis of power law distributions and network
topology related to the Internet to support his contention that there is an “intrinsic process” (p.
261) that enables all voices to be heard. The analysis, however, measures a website’s power
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(and, therefore, the owner’s power) by the number of links that can direct traffic to the website.
Such a framework can be useful, but does not allow for measuring ownership in economic or
financial terms.
Hindman (2009) has explored the idea of media concentration within the Internet, and has
attempted to compare this concentration to other media outlets. In his study, he observed and
concluded “that online audiences are at least as concentrated as those in the traditional media” (p.
96).

Hindman’s study, however, used website traffic (or circulation/audience figures, for

traditional media) to determine a media outlet’s strength, not financial or economic data such as
revenues.
Further, Hindman treats each “media outlet” (e.g., radio station) as an individual member
of the group. Such an approach does not, therefore, allow for the fact that one media company
could own multiple outlets. Inasmuch as this issue of ownership concentration is largely
concerned with the effect of consolidation, and a single entity owning multiple outlets, this study
doesn’t allow for definite conclusions or observations with respect to that concern. For
measuring traffic distribution, Hindman’s study could be of value; for purposes of determining
ownership diversity, however, his model is unable to allow for key factors.
It is clear that many different researchers have tried to understand the competitive
structure of the Internet. Indeed, such attention to this issue is a testament to the influence that
the Internet has already garnered as a mass medium in such a short period of time. The Internet
has been regarded by some as the fastest growing medium (Rooh-e-Aslam, Ali, & Shabir, 2009).
Given its rapid growth and pervasiveness in society and throughout the media industry, it is
important to examine the pattern of its adoption and its effect on the market structure of the
media industry. It is hypothesized that increases in the adoption rate of the Internet will lead to
an increased level of competition within the media industry.
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H3: Changes in the adoption rate of the Internet as a new media innovation should be
inversely related to changes in the market concentration of the media industry.
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Chapter Five
Methodology
In order to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter Four, several different measurements
will be used. First, change in the market structure of the media industry will be measured on an
annual basis. Section A discusses different measurements that can be used to quantify market
structure, and provides justification for using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) as the
preferred measure of market structure. The change in the annual levels of HHI will be the
dependent variable for this study. Additionally, Section A describes the data to be collected and
how it will be analyzed in order to calculate the HHI and change in HHI.
Section B operationalizes the adoption rate of each of the three technological innovations
studied in this project—television, cable television, and the Internet. The annual changes in
these measures will be the independent variables for the study. Section B explains the data
collection procedures required in order to measure the change in the annual adoption rate for
each innovation examined in the study. Recognizing that other influences may also affect the
changing market structure of the media industry, two variables designed to measure government
regulation and changes in economic conditions are also included in the analysis as control
variables. Section C explains how these variables will be operationalized and measured.
Finally, OLS regression will be employed to determine the presence of a causal
relationship between changes in innovation adoption and changes in media market structure.
Section D outlines the empirical strategy that will be used. For all of the change variables to be
studied, the logarithm of the value of the year-to-year change will be used.4

4

The change variables are GDP and the adoption rates of each technological innovation. Regulatory environment is
not a change variable.
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A. Dependent Variable: Measuring Market Structure
This study will determine and measure the effect that innovation has on the market
structure of the media industry. As such, the dependent variable for this study will be a
measurement of annual change in the market structure of the media industry. As stated above,
this study operationalizes market structure as a measurement of ownership concentration, as
defined by market share held by each company.
1. Measurement Instruments. There are numerous tools for measuring ownership
concentration among a group of companies. The HHI will be used to measure the market
structure of the media industry in this study. The benefits for using the HHI over other measures
of concentration will be explained further in this section.
a. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is one of the most widely used
measurements of ownership concentration within a particular industry or other group of
companies (McCauliffe, 1997). The HHI is used by many regulatory agencies including the U.S.
Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Federal Reserve Bank. It is
one of the factors that regulators consider when studying a merger’s potential effect on the
competitive landscape of a particular industry or market (Department of Justice, 2010).
The HHI is the sum of squares of the market shares of all firms within the group of
n

companies being analyzed. The calculation is represented as: HHI=  ( MS i ) 2 , where MS i
i 1

represents the market share of firm i with n firms in the market. The resulting sum of these
squared market shares—the HHI—can be as high as 10,000 (which would show monopolistic
concentration and, hence, no ownership diversity) or as low as < 1.0 (for a highly diversified
market or industry). For example, a true monopoly, in which one company has 100% of the
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market share, would have an HHI of 10,000 (1002 = 10,000). On the other hand, a market with
100 firms each maintaining 1% of the market would result in an HHI measurement of 100:
n 100

(

 (1)

2

 (1 *1)1  (1 *1) 2 ....  (1 *1)100  100 ).

The Department of Justice, when assessing the impact of proposed mergers, considers an
industry or market to be “unconcentrated” if the HHI measurement is 1500 or less (Department
of Justice, 2010). Those markets with an HHI measurement between 1500 and 2500 are
considered to be “moderately concentrated,” and markets with an HHI measurement greater than
2500 are considered “highly concentrated.”
One of the advantages of the HHI ratio is that it considers a greater number of companies
within a particular industry or market and it considers the impact of each individual company’s
market share on the overall concentration measure (e.g., HHI). For example, one market with
four companies could be much more concentrated than another market with the same number of
companies simply because of different market share distributions.
Once the concentration level has been determined by calculating the HHI, year-to-year
differences will be calculated and used as the dependent variable. Changes in concentration are a
more appropriate measurement to use as the dependent variable; the “impact” or effect that the
independent variables generate are more meaningfully portrayed in the change of the level of
market structure.
b. CR4 and CR8 ratios. The C4 and C8 ratios measure concentration within an industry
or market by adding the market shares of the top four (or eight) firms within the targeted industry
(Albarran & Dimmick, 1996). These ratios were utilized in Albarran and Dimmick’s study of
“across industry concentration,” which found high concentration within certain segments of the
media industry, but no level of high concentration within the media industry as a whole (1996).
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Because the CR ratios only consider four or eight companies within an industry, the ratios may
present an incomplete and inaccurate picture of that industry. For example, two industries with
identical market share distributions among its respective top eight firms would have equal CR8
scores, even if one of those industries had 50 additional companies with relatively small market
shares.
c. HHI vs. CR ratios. While the HHI ratio and the CR ratios both provide some indication
of a market’s concentration, even Albarran and Dimmick, when using the CR4 and CR8 ratios in
their study, acknowledged the HHI was “the best measure of concentration” (p. 44, 1996). Their
study did not use the HHI because of their inability to include every company within the media
industry, including private firms that do not make revenue figures available to the public. This
perceived limitation is unwarranted because the market share for any single smaller firm—
particularly with numerous competitors in the industry—does not by itself significantly impact
the HHI (Greco, 2000).
Moreover, the HHI has been widely used when studying different aspects of media
concentration, including content diversity (Einstein, 2002; Napoli, 1997) as well as ownership
concentration or market structure (Compaine & Gomery, 2000; Drushel, 1998; Greco, 2000;
Noam, 2009). The HHI is therefore considered to be a more robust and appropriate measurement
of ownership concentration than are the CR4 and CR8 ratios. Because of its strengths, the HHI
will be the measurement-of-choice when testing for any relationship between market structure
and innovation.
Appendix B lists values calculated for the HHI from 1950-2009. Appendix A provides a
sample of the companies that were included in the study in order to calculate the HHI; the
sample in Appendix A includes all companies for the years 1950,1955, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975,
1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2009.
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2. Sample Selection. The sample in this study will include publicly traded corporations
with media operations in the United States. Publicly traded companies are the measured
population for both practical and theoretical reasons. Because this study relies on market shares
based on revenues, it will be necessary to access annual revenue figures for each media
company, which is required of all publicly traded companies. Privately-owned media
companies—which by definition are not required to publicly release financial data—could
therefore not be included in this study, as their revenue figures would likely not be available.
Moreover, public companies must ensure that the financial information released has been
audited by an independent auditing firm. In the unlikely event that a private company did release
financial information to the public, there is no requirement that the information be complete or
independently verified. As such, it is only practical to include revenue data for publicly traded
companies.
There is also a theoretical basis for not including firms that are not publicly traded
companies. Dunaway (2008, 2011) has argued that private (i.e., not publicly traded) companies
do not have the same financial pressures and constraints as publicly traded firms, and therefore
are more able and more likely to be managed for other objectives besides just profitability and
revenue growth. As a result, it is likely that concerns of diminishing diversity and localism are
not as prevalent when examining smaller, private companies. These concerns are often what
drive media policymakers calling for regulation that would hinder larger conglomerates from
gaining even further market power (Baker, 2007). Therefore, publicly traded companies are the
most likely suspects for engaging in monopolistic behavior and also may be those most likely to
be the targets of government regulation.
As detailed in Chapter One, companies in the U.S. media industry are defined as those
companies in the business of creating, distributing, or owning content for consumption by mass
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audiences. This definition differs slightly from Compaine and Gomery’s (2000) definition who
include local and long distance telephone providers in their sample. The present study does not
include telephone service providers unless they offer other mass media related services (e.g.,
cable television, Internet services). In those cases, the media-related revenues will be included.
Companies included in this study classified primarily within the ‘51’ sector of the North
American Industry Classification System—NAICS. The NAICS is a system of classifying
businesses to allow for easier collection of meaningful statistical data related to businesses and
the business economy in general (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). The NAICS—developed jointly by
the U.S., Canada and Mexico, replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC)
in 1997. Within the NAICS, sector 51 includes all companies in the information industries, and
includes subsectors such as publishing, motion picture, broadcasting, and telecommunications.
An additional sector—sector 71—includes companies in the “Arts, Entertainment, and
Recreation” industries. However, these organizations are generally non-media related:
subsectors include museums, performing arts, and gambling.
Beyond relying on the NAICS categories to draw the sample, additional sources have
been used to identify other companies with media-related operations that may not have been
included in either the 51 or 71 sectors. These include the Value Line Investment Survey, which
offers independent investment information and covers more than 1,700 publicly traded
companies (Value Line, 2012). Relevant industries within the Value Line database include Cable
TV, Entertainment, Information Services, Internet, Newspaper, Publishing, and Telecom
Services. Within these industries, a company may or may not be included, depending on the
specific types of revenue-generating activity the company is engaged in. This method, for
example, resulted in the addition of companies such as The Washington Post Corporation—
which owns educational and test preparation services through its Kaplan, Inc. subsidiary. The
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Washington Post Corporation was categorized by the NAICS in its Educational Services (61)
sector. As such, it would not have been included by only considering companies listed in the
NAICS as being in either sector 51 or 71.
In addition, foreign companies are included if they engage in meaningful media
operations in the United States. Examples of such companies include Japanese-based Sony
Corporation and the German-based company Bertelsmann. In these cases, only revenues
generated within the United States—as reported in the company’s annual reports—were included
in the market share calculations.
3. Data Collection Methods. Revenues used in this study were accessed through
Compustat North America. The Compustat North America database provides historical and
restated financial data on active and inactive publicly traded companies, which allows year-toyear comparisons. For most companies in the database, annual financial history is available
going back to 1950 (Standard & Poor's, 2011). For the years 1975 and beyond, Compustat
provides total annual revenues as well as revenues generated by operating segments and
geographic segments. For these years, it is possible to include only revenues associated with
media-related businesses in the United States, which is the focus of this study.
This allows for using only revenues that were derived from U.S. operations, which is a
better measurement of market structure within the U.S. media industry. For example, News
Corporation reported revenues in fiscal year 2009 of $30 billion (News Corporation, 2009).
However, the company also indicated that $16.6 billion of these revenues came from U.S.
operations; the remaining revenues were generated from operations throughout the rest of the
world. In assessing News Corporation’s market share of the U.S. media industry, only those
revenues generated from U.S. operations (i.e., $16.6 billion) would be considered. In doing so,
News Corporation is more accurately portrayed as a company that is very similar to Time
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Warner Cable, which reported revenues in 2009 of $15.9 billion (Time Warner Cable Inc.,
2009). By eliminating revenues generated from non-U.S. operations, a more accurate picture of
the U.S. media market is presented.
In addition, only revenues derived from media operations were included. As a result,
revenues for Walt Disney Company’s theme parks and consumer products, for example, were
not included. Disney reported total revenues in 2009 of $36.1 billion (The Walt Disney
Company, 2009). However, when eliminating “non-media” operations (e.g., theme parks,
consumer products, etc.), revenues are $22.3 billion. Accordingly, revenue figures in this study
may be different than total revenues reported by a particular company for a specific fiscal year.
The examples of News Corporation and Walt Disney illustrate why it is desirable to use
segmented revenues reflecting only media operations within the United States. Unfortunately,
the Compustat database of revenue data for the years 1950—1975 does not segment revenues by
either operating or geographic segments. For these years, total revenue for each company is
provided, without any breakdown by operations or countries. As a result, it is difficult to
measure the market structure of the media industry for the 1950—1975 timeframe as accurately
as for the years beyond 1975. Several variations of the OLS model will be used that adjust the
market shares for those companies (heretofore known as “conglomerates”) with significant nonmedia or foreign media revenues during the 1950—1975 period. These variations, and the
reasoning for employing them, will be discussed further in Chapter Six.
Using the company revenues from the Compustat database, market shares for each
individual company will be calculated in order to determine the HHI and the CR4 and CR8
indices. The basis for measuring market structure, therefore, is each company’s revenue
generated from its media related operations, with some adjustments when necessary.
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B. Independent Variables: Measuring Innovation
As previously argued, this study hypothesizes that the pattern of adoption of an
innovation is more critical than the introduction of the innovation itself when attempting to
measure the impact of the innovation on market structure. Accordingly, this study measures the
adoption rates for each of the three technological innovations examined (television, cable
television, and the Internet).
1. Measurement Instrument. For each technological innovation examined, the rate of
adoption is measured by annual change in the percentage of U.S. households utilizing that
particular medium. Other statistics, such as sales based measures, provide some insight into the
diffusion of these technologies throughout the general public, but are less robust for representing
the actual adoption rate. For example, relying on the number of televisions sold in a given year
may show the popularity of television, but does not necessarily provide an accurate indication of
if and how television is broadening its reach to more people. New television sales could be
generated by current television owners, choosing to buy a second or third television. In such a
case, an increase in television sales doesn’t necessarily expose more people to the technology,
whereas adoption by a new household does. Therefore, a household-based measure of adoption
is a more appropriate basis for measurement for purposes of this study. As such, using the
percentage of households with televisions provides a more meaningful method of measuring the
adoption of television for purposes of this study.
2. Data Collection. Data detailing the adoption rate of both television and cable
television for the years 1950—2009—as measured by the penetration into U.S. households—is
available from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (heretofore referred to as “The
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Abstract”). The Abstract is published annually by the United States Census Bureau.5 The
Abstract is a self-described “comprehensive summary of statistics on the social, political, and
economic organization of the United States” (http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/). In
addition to information generated by the Census Bureau, The Abstract includes data from other
sources including the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
For information regarding the adoption of the Internet, the Census Bureau has released
annual data indicating the percentage of households with access to the Internet. However, the
Census Bureau did not begin collecting this information until 1997; by then already 18% of
households were reported as having access to the Internet. Moreover, the Census Bureau has
also not reported any household Internet access figures beyond 2009. Accordingly, using Census
Bureau data would limit the number of data points (i.e., years) that could be used for this study,
and would not provide important information as to the adoption rate of early adopters in the
years preceding 1997.
Two other sources are also available for the rate of Internet adoption. Pew Research
Center has tracked the percentage of U.S. adults using the Internet for the period of 1995-2012
(Pew Research Center, 2012). In addition, The World Bank has released data showing Internet
users as a percentage of the population in the United States, from 1990 through 2009 (The World
Bank, 2012). For this study, the World Bank data will be used as it is the only data source which
provides uninterrupted figures annually; the other two sources have periodic skips where data is
not reported for a particular year.
Appendix C presents adoption rates on a year-to-year basis for television, cable
television, and the Internet. Where there is no adoption rate for an innovation in a given year, it

5

The Census Bureau has announced that the Statistical Abstract will no longer be published annually after 2011.
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can be assumed that the innovation had not yet been introduced to the public, and will not be
included in any analysis.
C. Control Variables: Regulation and Economic Influences
Other variables may be likely to affect changes in market structure. As such, two control
variables are included in the models; namely, a variable to reflect regulatory influences, and a
second variable reflecting economic influences.
1. Regulatory Influences. Cleavage theory advocates the idea that political parties’
positions “reflect divisions in the social structure and the ideologies that provoke and express
those group divisions” (p. 585, Marks, Wilson, & Ray 2002). Marks, et al. have shown that a
party’s position on a new or emerging issue is strongly influenced by the party’s general
ideological positions. This concept can be extended to argue that a party’s general philosophical
position could be a predictor of that party’s regulatory approach when serving as a governing
party (Coate, 2002). As such, this model controls for the expectation that regulatory policies of a
Republican administration will differ than those of a “non-Republican” administration. This
expectation is based on the reality that a presidential administration enacts and enforces its
regulatory policies through the appointment of cabinet and agency heads (e.g., Department of
Justice, FCC, FTC) empowered with regulating the media industry. For this study, a control
variable—Regulatory Climate—will be operationalized as a dummy variable, indicating a
Republican administration (i.e., value of ‘1’) or a non-Republican administration (i.e., value of
‘0’). Appendix D provides the values of this dummy variable for each year during the 1950—
2009 timeframe.
The differences between a Republican and non-Republican administration may have an
effect on the business climate in general, and the market structure of an industry specifically.
Generally, Republican Party policy has been characterized as a pro-business, deregulatory
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focused policy (Shenk, 1995). This laissez-faire approach manifests itself in many ways,
including the calls for limiting restrictions on how and when businesses may grow and expand.
Such an approach would tend to be less interested in actively limiting the market strength of a
particular company, and therefore it is considered that Republican regulatory policies would
create an environment conducive to the accumulation of market power among a few large and
powerful corporations.
Conversely, Democratic Party policy is characterized as pro-consumer oriented. Such an
orientation is in part based on the idea that using regulatory policy to expand competition and
limit an individual company’s market power is desirable for consumers. It is anticipated that the
regulatory environment under a Republican administration will lead to a concentrated media
market structure (i.e., increasing HHI).
2. Economic Influences. Inasmuch as this study incorporates economic concepts in
order to measure the media industry, it is reasonable to assume that general economic trends may
also influence an industry and its market structure. The GDP, as defined by the U.S. Department
of Commerce, is “the output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the
United States” (Bureau of Economic Statistics, 2012). The GDP is commonly used as a
measurement of the condition of a nation’s economy (Abramowitz, 2008; Chamberlin, 2011).
Comparisons of the GDP from year-to-year provide measurement of the growth or contraction of
the economy. GDP figures for each year are released by the U.S. Department of Commerce;
these figures will be used in this study as an indication of economic conditions.
Economic conditions would likely influence individuals and corporations in their
spending decisions as well as their investment decisions in research and developments. It would
be expected that both of these decisions would impact the expansion or contraction of the media
industry, and therefore its market structure. Specifically, it is anticipated that increases in GDP
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will result in decreases in ownership concentration of the media industry as measured by HHI.
Appendix D provides the values of this dummy variable for each year during the 1950—2009
timeframe.
D. Measuring the Relationship between Innovation and Market Structure
This study relies on multivariate analysis to determine the presence and nature of a causal
relationship between each of the independent variables and the market structure of the media
industry.
1. Data Structure and Analysis. Because the data and relationship of interest involve
change over time, it is important to consider the use of time series analysis to determine the
extent to which the dependent variable is influenced by previous values of itself as well as other
variables.
Time series analysis techniques are important when analyzing trends in data that report
values of a particular variable (or variables) over a period of time (Stock & Watson, 1988). In
such a situation, it is likely that the dependent variable is influenced in part by previous values of
itself. In a linear regression analysis this measure of influence would not be accounted for, and
would result in the error term for a particular time being correlated with the error terms of
previous and subsequent times (Maddala, 1988). The error terms, therefore, would be
autocorrellated; time series analysis helps to identify and measure the component of the error
term specifically related to the longitudinal nature of the data and to address any autocorrelation
issues.
The review of the previous literature presented in Chapter Two clearly supports the idea
that the adoption of an innovation generally occurs over a period of time. As such, it is possible
that measuring the effect of such adoption on any variable such as market structure may need to
be analyzed over a period of time. Some researchers specifically examining the relationship
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between innovation and the media market structure have utilized such an approach (Dowd,
2004).
Even researchers studying this relationship that have not relied on time series analysis
nonetheless acknowledge its relevance, as evidenced by Peterson and Berger (1996), who argued
that “Future studies that use regression models to test the relationship between concentration and
innovation . . . will need to be sensitive to the assumptions underlying the methods of timeordered analysis of historical processes” (p. 177).
To determine whether or not time series analysis is the appropriate methodology for this
study, the Box Jenkins approach was employed, which helps identify and estimate time-series
models (Enders, 2004). Box Jenkins diagnostics help determine whether or not a prior value of
the dependent variable influences and predicts future variables. The Box Jenkins approach
recognizes three components to a time-series model: an autoregressive component, a moving
average component, and an integrated component. A time series relationship may have any or
all of these components. The Box Jenkins methodology helps to determine the presence of each
of these components which, combined, are represented in an ARIMA model.6 Each component
will be explained, and results indicating the presence or absence of each will be discussed.
Initially, tests for integration (the ‘I’ of the ARIMA model) of each variable were
conducted. An Integrated variable, by definition, violates key assumptions of time-series data.
Those assumptions are:
1) The variable has a constant mean,
2) The variable has a constant variance, and
3) The effect of a prior observation on future observations is a decaying one.

When using the Box Jenkins method for analyzing variables, the “AR” and “MA” components are tested only for
the dependent variable.
6
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Further, an integrated variable is considered to be influenced by its previous observation,
but purely randomly. Integrated variables, by definition, are considered to have unit roots, so the
effect of a prior value of that variable on its current value never diminishes. To test for
integration, two tests—the augmented Dickey Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test—were
applied to the dependent variable and each independent variable individually. Each allows for
testing a null hypothesis that the variable does has a unit root.
Table 1 shows the results of the Dickey-Fuller test, while Table 2 presents the results of
the Phillips-Perron test. Results of both tests lead to the conclusion that the null hypothesis can
only be rejected for the “TV-Adoption” variable. In other words, it is assumed that unit roots
exist for “Market Structure,” “Cable-Adoption,” and “Internet-Adoption” variables. In the case
of “Market Structure,” the Phillips-Perron test does indicate that the null hypothesis can be
rejected, but only at the p<.10 level. Given the results of the Dickey-Fuller test and the failure to
reject the null hypothesis at the p<.05 and p<.01, it is assumed that a unit root exists for the
“Market Structure” variable.
Table 1. Results, Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test.

Market
Structure
(HHI)
TV
Adoption
Cable TV
Adoption
Internet
Adoption

Test Statistic
Z(t)

1% Critical
Value

5% Critical
Value

10% Critical
Value

-2.470

-3.562

-2.923

-2.596

Mackinnon
approximate
p-value for
Z(t)
0.123

-16.524

-3.569

-2.924

-2.597

0.0000

-0.603

-3.576

-2.928

-2.599

0.8702

-0.075

-3.750

-3.000

-2.630

0.9519
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Table 2. Results, Phillips-Perron Test.
Test Statistic
Z(t)

1% Critical
Value

5% Critical
Value

10% Critical
Value

-2.697

-3.567

-2.923

-2.596

Mackinnon
approximate
p-value for
Z(t)
0.0745

-28.662

-3.569

-2.924

-2.597

0.0000

-0.629

-3.576

-2.928

-2.599

0.8644

-0.211

-3.750

-3.000

-2.630

0.9372

Market
Structure
(HHI)
TV
Adoption
Cable TV
Adoption
Internet
Adoption

Results of the tests for integration on the “TV-Adoption” variable are somewhat
incongruous with the nature of the data: Rejecting the null hypothesis that “TV-Adoption” has a
unit root would imply that the trend for “TV-Adoption” is a linear one. However, as Figure 3
illustrates, a view of the trend of “TV-Adoption” shows a curvilinear relationship.
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Figure 3. Television Adoption Rate. (Adoption rate of television as measured by
percent of U.S. households with televisions for the years 1950-2009.)
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Given the obvious illustration that “TV-Adoption” is not a linear trend, the more
conservative approach to reconciling the diagnostic results with the graph results is to assume the
variable is integrated (i.e., has a unit root), and does not have a constant mean or variance.
Again, Figure 3 supports this approach.
Having concluded that the variables in this study each contain a unit root, further
analytics are required in order to determine the most appropriate model for testing the
hypotheses. Specifically, each independent variable must be examined to see if it is cointegrated
with the dependent variable. Cointegrated variables, by definition, share a unit root and have a
normally distributed error (Granger, 1981). If two integrated variables do not share a stochastic
trend (i.e., normally distributed error), then any correlation is deemed to be spurious.
To detect such cointegration among these variables the Engle-Granger test is applied to
each independent variable paired with the dependent variable. Table 3 presents results of the
Engle-Granger test as applied to each pair; results support the conclusion that the null hypothesis
(“The variables are not cointegrated”) can be rejected. Therefore, it is assumed that each
independent variable is cointegrated with the dependent variable, and that these relationships are
not spurious.
Because the variables are cointegrated, the equation should not include a time trend as a
regressed variable (Mocan, 1999). Without the presence of such a time trend, testing for the
autoregressive component of the ARIMA model is unnecessary, and it is concluded that p=0,
where p is the number of lags included in the autoregressive component to allow for the effect of
any time trend. The same can be concluded with respect to the white noise of the model being
developed, and therefore moving average components (“MA”) are nonexistent. In this case, q=0,
where q is the number of lags in the forecast errors. Finally, when time series variables are
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cointegrated, the equation used to test the hypotheses must incorporate the changes in the value
of the variables.
Table 3. Results, Engle-Granger Test.
Test
Statistic
Z(t)

1% Critical
Value

5% Critical
Value

10%
Critical
Value

Market
Structure/TV
Adoption

-0.308

-3.654

-2.957

-2.618

Market
Structure/Cable
TV Adoption

-0.411

-3.654

-2.957

-2.618

Market
Structure/Internet
Adoption

-2.468

-3.833

-3.031

-2.656

Mackinnon
Critical
Values

In summary, diagnostic tests on the preliminary data revealed no time trend for the
dependent variable. Accordingly, this proposed study need not employ time series analysis to
examine annual changes in media market structures as a function of annual rates of technological
adoptions. Instead, it is appropriate to utilize OLS regression of the changes in the studied
variables as measured by the logarithms of these changes.
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Chapter Six
Results
Having determined that OLS regression is the appropriate method for studying the
research questions, this chapter presents results of regression analyses for different models using
different assumptions regarding the market shares for the conglomerates for the 1950—1975
period. First, Section A reviews the data that was collected in order to measure each of the
variables identified and defined in Chapter Five. The measurement of market structure—as
represented by the HHI—is examined more closely in Section B in order to more fully
understand the trends and evolution of the market structure of the media industry over time. As
will be noted in that section, the difficulty with collecting media-only revenue data for the
1950—1975 period means that the 1976—2009 timeframe will be more closely examined when
trying to understand the evolution of the media market structure.
Given the difficulties resulting from the two different data sets used for this study,
different strategies will be utilized to create a uniform data set that is the best solution for
combining the two data sets into one set that can be used for the study. Section C considers
revenue data from both data sets, without any adjustments to try and estimate media only
revenues. Sections D through H employ different approaches to estimate a “media-only”
revenue scenario. These approaches are explained in the respective sections. Finally, Section I
specifically examines the effect of the adoption rate of the Internet only (i.e., without considering
the adoption rate of other technological innovations) on the market structure of the media.
A. Description of Data
The data collected for each variable is described in Appendix E with a summary of the
descriptive statistics for each variable. Because the three independent variables are designed to
measure adoption rates for different media, it is appropriate and meaningful to compare the
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statistics for these variables. Figure 4 illustrates the trends for each of the three independent
variables.
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Figure 4. Adoption Rates by Technology. (Adoption rate of each technological innovation
examined in this study. Adoption is measured by the percent of U.S. households that have the
respective technology, as measured by the U.S. Statistical Abstract for the years 1950—2009.
As noted in Appendix E, it is interesting to note that the number of observations for “TV
Adoption” and “Cable TV Adoption” are similar (NTV Adoption = 59, NCable TV Adoption= 54),
indicating that the adoption of these two technologies has occurred over a similar timeframe.
This is also evident in Figure 4 by the fact that the trend lines for “TV Adoption” and “Cable TV
Adoption” are similar in terms of the length of time each line measures. However, despite the
fact that the adoption of television and cable television have occurred over a similar length of
time, these variables report noticeably different means ( X

TV Adoption =

90.2, X

Cable TV Adoption =

33.29), medians (M TV Adoption = 97.7, M Cable TV Adoption = 22.21), and ranges (Range TV Adoption =
12.0—98.3, Range Cable TV Adoption = 0.5—72.4). These statistics provide evidence and
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confirmation that the adoption patterns for television and cable television are different: The
public’s adoption of television was much more rapid and pervasive than was the adoption of
cable television.
With regards to cable television adoption, those statistics which differ from television
adoption appear to be very similar to the respective statistics for Internet adoption, particularly
the means ( X
Adoption

Cable TV Adoption =

33.29, X

Internet Adoption =

38.87) and the ranges (Range Cable TV

= min (0.5), max (72.4), Range Internet Adoption = min (0.8), max (29.45). Such results

indicate that the adoption pattern for cable television and the Internet may share a similar trend,
but the pattern for the Internet was accomplished in nearly one-third the timeframe that it took
for cable television. Again, this is illustrated in Figure 4, showing that the trends for both “Cable
TV Adoption” and “Internet Adoption” are characterized by lines forming S-shaped curves,
although the slopes of each are significantly different. Such findings further support the
contention by some that the Internet is the fastest growing communications medium (Rooh-eAslam, Ali, & Shabir, 2009).
B. Identifying Trends in the Evolution of the Market Structure of the Media Industry
Having collected revenue data on media companies used in this sample for the years
1950—2009, Figure 5 shows the trend in the HHI as a measure of media market concentration
for this timeframe. Data collected for the years 1950—1975 include all revenues for companies,
including revenues that are not from media-related operations.
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Figure 5. Media Industry Concentration, 1950—2009. (This figure tracks the markeket structure
of the media industry during the 1950—2009 period. “Market structure” is defined as
concentration of ownership as measured by market shares of each media company included in
the study. The level of concentration is represented by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
One measure includes all media companies, including conglomerates which reported non-media
revenue incomes for the years 1950—1974. The second measure eliminates these companies for
the entire period.
As such, the measure of concentration for this timeframe may be skewed. To provide
some perspective into how much of an effect these companies may have on the HHI
measurement, a second measurement (“without conglomerates”) is presented that considers the
market structure of the media industry if these companies are eliminated for the entire timeframe.
The result shows that both trends are very similar, although the variance from year-to-year is
greater when including all companies. Additionally, the impact of these companies is seen by
the dramatic drop in market concentration from 1975—1976, representing the elimination of
non-media revenues from one year to the next.
As shown in Table 4, the results provided by these two different approaches are highly
correlated (r=.9510). As a result, while it may be difficult to reach conclusions as to the precise
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HHI value, particularly for the 1950—1975 timeframe, it is nevertheless possible to identify
trends over the entire 60-year period, since the trends are highly correlated. Indeed, there
appears to be five distinct trends during this time period, with some phases lasting longer than
others.
Table 4. Pearson Correlations: HHI with and without conglomerates’
revenues.
With Without
With
1.0000
0.9510
Without
0.9510
1.0000
*Correlation is significant at the p<.01 level (two-tailed)
The results indicate an initial trend of a generally steep decline in market concentration
beginning in 1950 and continuing through the early 1970s.7 For the next few years (until 1976),
fluctuations in the level of concentration are minimal, and the trend line is generally flat. By
1976, the market structure enters another phase of declining concentration which continues until
1987.8 From 1987 through 2001, the HHI value stabilizes within a 90-point range. After 2001,
market concentration begins to increase, and a general upward trend continues throughout the
remainder of the time period analyzed in this study. To be sure, the final year—2009—shows a
noticeable decline. Whether or not this is the beginning of a new trend or a mere fluctuation
cannot be determined, but should be examined as subsequent years’ worth of revenue data are
collected and additional HHI measurements are calculated.
C. Effect of Technological Adoption on the Market Structure of the Media
Applying equation 5.1 to the preliminary data for market structure and adoption of
television and cable television, regression results are presented in Table 5.

7

Depending on which trend line used, the declining trends ends in either 1973 or 1974.
When analyzing the trend post-1975, HHI figures which include all companies and all revenues, including
conglomerates, are used.
8
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Table 5. (Model 1) OLS regression estimates for model of
Media Structure, with unadjusted market shares.
Constant
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
Regulatory Climate [+]

N
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Prob > F

b
0.038
(0.041)
-0.417
(0.850)
-0.102
(0.160)
-1.24
(0.786)
-0.016
(0.0334)

t
0.91
-0.49
-0.64
-1.57

*

-0.48

53
0.0714
-0.006
0.92
0.4584

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient in
parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

This model (“Model 1”) includes all revenues for the companies studied. This includes
nine conglomerates which report a significant drop in market share from 1975—the final year of
unsegmented revenue reporting—to 1976—the first year of segmented revenue reporting. For
purposes of this study, a decline in market share of 20% or greater was considered “significant,”
and appropriate for an adjustment in market share data for the first half of the study. Figure 6
illustrates the adoption rates of the two media technologies in relation to the trend of the market
structure of the media, as measured by HHI. For Figure 6, HHI is based on all companies
(including conglomerates) and, for the 1950-1975 timeframe, all revenues (including non-media
67

operations of those conglomerates). This is consistent with the assumptions used for Model 1,
albeit future models are based on different assumptions regarding the calculation of HHI.

Figure 6. Adoption Rates and HHI
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Figure 6. Adoption Rates and HHI. (Adoption rate of Television and Cable TV, compared to
media market structure, as measured by HHI. Adoption rate is measured by the percent of U.S.
households that have the respective technology, as measured by the U.S. Statistical Abstract for
the years 1950—2009.)
Table 6 presents these companies with the market shares for each company in 1975—
based on unsegmented revenues—and in 1976—based on segmented revenues. For Model 1, no
adjustments were made to any of these companies, so the revenue data used includes revenues
from all operations associated with each company.
The results do not support the conclusion that the model represents a “good fit” in terms
of explaining the relationship between the causal variables and media market structure (“Prob >
F” = .4582). Accordingly, the null hypothesis that this model does not provide a good estimate
of media market structure cannot be rejected. Additionally, the model offers minimal
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explanatory power (R2 = 0.0714). Only one control variable—GDP—is shown to be a
statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable at the p>.10 level (b=-1.24, t=-1.57).

Table 6. Companies with significant declines in market share when data
source changes.
1975
1976
% Change in
Market Share Market Share Market Share
Cadence Industries
0.469
0.326
30.49
Chris-Craft
0.326
0.134
58.90
Cinerama
0.387
0.028
92.76
Disney
2.77
0.827
70.14
Harcourt General
1.91
1.17
38.74
Journal Communications
1.23
0.69
43.90
MacMillan
2.54
1.3
48.82
Post Corp
0.112
0.059
47.32
RCA
25.53
5.76
77.44
Total
35.274
10.294
---The model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP will result in a 1.24unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry. None of the
remaining variables are shown to be statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable.
D. Removing companies with non-media revenues from consideration in the model
For the nine conglomerates, the change in their respective market shares decreases by
over 20% from the year 1975 (the last year that unsegmented revenues are reported) to the year
1976 (the first year that segmented revenues are reported, allowing for an examination
specifically of media-only revenues). While it is possible that companies may show revenue
declines over any given one-year period, the large declines are explained to some degree because
these companies were diversified conglomerates, with non-media operations generating
significant revenues during the 1950-1975 period.
RCA, for example, was a leader in the consumer electronics industry and not just in the
media industry through its NBC Radio and NBC Television operations. The impact of these
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non-media revenues on the analysis of the market structure for the 1950—1975 period could be
significant. As Table 6 shows, the combined market share in 1975 for these nine conglomerates
totaled 35.27%; the following year—when media-only revenues are analyzed—these nine
companies only represented 10.29% of the market. Put another way, the data suggest that nonmedia revenues for RCA during the 1950—1975 period of analysis could be as much as 25% of
all the revenues analyzed in Model 1.9
There are several options that could be considered for minimizing the impact that the
non-media revenues from these nine conglomerates might have on this study. The first option is
to completely eliminate these companies from analysis during the 1950—1975 time frame. Such
an adjustment would obviously impact the measure of annual concentration for the media
industry (i.e., HHI) and the regression estimates for the model of the Structure of the Media. The
regression results for this model (“Model 2”) are presented in Table 7.
The results indicate that this model is a good fit estimate for explaining the relationship between
the causal variables and the change in media market structure (“Prob > F” = .0291; “Prob >F” <
.05). This model offers a moderate level of explanatory power (R2 =.1977), and includes two
variables that are statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable. The first variable,
as in the first model studied, is the economic climate variable, as reflected by annual changes in
GDP (b=-1.2, t=-2.32). Here, the model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP
will result in a 1.2-unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media market
structure. In addition, this model shows one technological adoption variable to be a statistically
significant predictor of the dependent variable: The model indicates that a change in the adoption
rate of television as a new medium predicts a change in the media market structure (b=-.755, t=-

9

In other words, the difference between the 1975 market share and the 1976 market share (35.27-10.29 = 24.98).
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1.35). Specifically, a one-unit increase in the adoption of television predicts a .755-unit decrease
in the concentration of the media market structure.
Table 7. (Model 2).OLS regression estimates for model of Media
Structure, with nine companies eliminated for 1950-1975 period.
b
t
Constant
0.03
1.1
(.027)
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
-0.76 -1.35 *
(.561)
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
-0.1 -0.95
(.105)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
-1.2 -2.32 **
(.518)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.01
0.59
(.022)
N
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Prob > F

53
0.1977
0.1308
2.96
0.0291

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient
in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

E. Removing RCA from consideration in the model
Returning to Table 6, a closer examination of the nine conglomerates with significant
non-media operations shows that one company in particular—RCA Corporation—more than any
other company is a major contributor of “non-media” revenue to this study during the 1950-1975
time period. Indeed, the difference between RCA’s market share in 1975 and 1976 shows a
difference of 19.77%, indicating that almost 20% of the entire “media market” analyzed in 1975
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was associated with non-media revenues solely generated by RCA. In comparison, the
difference between the 1975 and 1976 market shares of the remaining eight companies combined
only represents 5.21% of the entire market analyzed. This is still a significant number, but given
the size of its market share, RCA could be viewed as an outlier by itself. As such, another
alternative to analyzing the relationship between the independent variables and the media market
structure is to remove only RCA from the study for the years where the non-media revenue
cannot be identified and eliminated. Using this approach, results of the regression analysis are
presented in Table 8.
Adjusting the market share data by removing RCA revenues does not result in an OLS
regression model that provides a “good fit” estimate of media market structure (“Prob > F”=
.1017). Moreover, the explanatory power of this model is weak (R2 = .1461).
As with the previous two models, the “economic climate” variable, reflecting the annual
change in GDP, is a statistically significant predictor of change in the media market structure
(b=-0.795, t=-1.59). The model predicts that a one-unit increase in GDP change will result in a
.795-unit decrease in change in the media market structure. For this model, the economic
climate variable is the only causal variable that is statistically significant.
F. Revising Market Shares
Including all revenues from the nine conglomerates in this study (i.e., Model 1) may
result in a skewed measure of market structure that indicates more concentration than there really
is, excluding all revenues from these conglomerates (i.e., Model 3) may also result in skewed
results. Excluding all revenues for the 1950—1975 period means that media revenues are
excluded as well, and the measure of media market structure could theoretically indicate more or
less concentration than what actually exists.
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Table 8. (Model 3). OLS regression estimates for model of Media
Structure, with RCA eliminated for 1950-1975 period.
b
t
Constant
0.015
0.55
(.026)
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
-0.48
-0.88
(.542)
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
-0.11
-1.08
(.102)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
-0.8
-1.59 *
(.501)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.02
0.99
(.213)
N
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Prob > F

53
0.1461
0.075
2.05
0.1017

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient
in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

Another alternative is to include these conglomerates in the study, but to adjust their
market shares in a way that more accurately reflects a measurement of media-only revenues.
One way to do this is to determine an “average” market share for each of the nine conglomerates,
and apply this average market share for the years 1950—1975 in lieu of using a market share
based on the conglomerate’s total revenues (non-media included).
For this approach, an average market share for each company was calculated by
averaging each conglomerate’s annual market share over the 1976-2009 period. This average
was then used as an estimate of the company’s market share for each year over the 1950—1975
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period. The average market share to be used for each company is presented in Table 9. The table
shows that, for example, Cadence Industries’ market share of the media industry averaged .3%
during the 1976-2009 period. This number will be used to reflect the company’s market share
during the 1950-1975 period in order to calculate a measure of market structure (HHI) for the
media industry over the entire period of study.
Table 9. Average Market Share to be applied,
1950-1975.
Average
Market Share
Cadence Industries
0.3
Chris-Craft
0.23
Cinerama
0.022
Disney
3.75
Harcourt General
0.86
Journal Communications
0.3
MacMillan
0.8
Post Corp
0.08
RCA
5.76
Having determined a measure of market structure with these assumed market shares, an
OLS regression analysis produced results detailed in Table 10 (“Model 4”).
The model does not necessarily represent the best fit as an explanation into the
relationship between the causal variables and the dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .0573). The
model also offers limited explanatory power with respect to identifying and explaining those
agents of influence on changes in the market structure of the media industry (R2 = .1705).
The model, however, does suggest two causal variables that are statistically significant
predictors of changes in the market structure of the media industry; namely, changes in the
adoption of television (b=-.685, t=-1.35), and changes in GDP (b=-.757, t=-1.61). The model
predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of the adoption rate of television will result
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Table 10. (Model 4).OLS regression estimates for model of
Media Structure, with estimated market shares for 1950-1975
period for nine conglomerates.
b
t
Constant
0.015
0.60
(.025)
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
-0.685 -1.35
(.507)
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
-0.096 -1.00
(.095)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
-0.757 -1.61
(.469)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.020
1.02
(.020)
N
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Prob > F

*
*

53
0.1705
0.1014
2.47
0.0573

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective
coefficient in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

in a .685-unit decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry. Further,
the model predicts that a one-unit increase in the change of GDP will result in a .757-unit
decrease in the annual change of the concentration of the media industry.
G. Considering Trends When Revising Market Shares
Model 4 attempts to provide a realistic estimate of the media-only market shares for the
nine conglomerates in this study, but this approach assumes that there is no fluctuation in the
market shares of these companies throughout the 1950-1975 timeframe. It is likely that each
company’s market share will fluctuate from year-to-year. To allow for these fluctuations, a final
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model with adjustments to conglomerate revenues will be considered in order to analyze the
effect that changes in the adoption rate of television and changes in the adoption rate of cable
television have on the dependent variable.
This model begins with an assumption that market shares for 1975 (the last year of
unsegmented revenues) are the same as the company’s market share for 1976 (the first year of
segmented revenues). The model then assumes that actual changes in a conglomerate’s market
share during the 1950-1975 period is similar to the changes in that company’s market share for
revenues specific to the media industry. In other words, if unsegmented (i.e., total) revenues for
RCA increased 4% from 1974 to 1975, then it is assumed that RCA media revenues also
increased by 4% during that timeframe. With this assumption, RCA’s 1974 media segment
market share can be calculated based on the estimated 1975 market share. These assumptions
produce market shares that are consistent with market shares generated from the segmented data
for the years 1976—2009, but also consistent with the year-to-year fluctuations in the company’s
revenues for the years 1950-1975. Using these estimates of market shares for the nine
companies, an OLS regression generates results detailed in Table 11 (“Model 5”).
The results indicate that this model is not a good fit for explaining the relationship
between the independent variables and the dependent variables (“Prob > F” = .0735). As with
prior models, this model offers minimal explanatory power (R2 = .1601), and only one causal
variable—change in GDP—is found to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent
variable (b=7.779, t=-1.65). It is interesting to note that this variable is the only one that has
shown to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable in every model that has
been tested.
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Table 11. (Model 5). OLS regression estimates for model of Media
Structure, with estimated market shares and trends for 1950-1975
period for nine conglomerates.
b
t
Constant
0.016
0.63
(.025)
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
-0.535 -1.05
(.510)
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
-0.110 -1.14
(.095)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
-0.779 -1.65 *
(.469)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.019
0.94
(.020)
N
R2
Adjusted R2
F
Prob > F

53
0.1601
0.0901
2.29
0.0735

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient
in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

H. Considering Segmented Revenues Only
The results presented thus far have all included revenues for the entire 1950—2009
timeframe. However, recognizing that the data for the first 26 years cannot provide media-only
revenues, each scenario reflects a different approach to try and use these 26 years in the analysis.
Another option, however, is to completely eliminate these years entirely from the analysis—not
just revenues from the nine conglomerates, but from all companies—and only examine 1976—
2009; the years where segmented revenues are available.
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One disadvantage to this approach is the fewer number of observations available for
inclusion in the model. In this case, N = 32, whereas the other models are based on N = 53.
However, if this model proves to be the most theoretically and empirically sound model, this
disadvantage could eventually go away; going forward, a new observation will be added each
year, as publicly traded companies currently continue to report segmented revenues on in their
annual reports. As such, the number of observations (i.e., N) will increase, and as this sample
size increases, eventually to an acceptable and desired number of observations.
Despite the limited number of observations, this model offers the benefit of examining
strictly media-related revenues, and the model does so without having to make estimates based
on assumptions that are likely to be unrealistic throughout the entire 1950—1975 period.
Results of this model (“Model 6”) are presented in Table 12. Unfortunately, the model
does not appear to be a best fit estimate of the relationship between the independent variables
and the dependent variables (“Prob > F” = .346). As with prior models, the explanatory power is
minimal; the model only explains approximately 15% of the variance between the independent
variables and the dependent variable (R2 =.1478).
Only one variable is shown to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent
variable. Interestingly, for the first time, the “Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate” variable is
shown to be statistically significant (b=-.355, t=-1.89). The model predicts that a one-unit
increase in the change of the adoption rate of Cable TV will result in a .355-unit decrease in the
change of media market structure. The results are interesting in that the change in the adoption
rate of TV is no longer a statistically significant predictor, but change in the adoption rate of
Cable TV is for the first time. This will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
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Table 12. (Model 6). OLS regression estimates for model of
Media Structure, 1976-2009.
b
t
Constant
0.021
0.59
(.036)
Change in Television Adoption Rate [-]
-0.943 -0.04
(21.32)
Change in Cable TV Adoption Rate [-]
-0.355 -1.89
(.188)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
-0.479 -0.63
(.763)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.022
0.77
(.029)
N

32

R2
Adjusted R
F
Prob > F

**

0.1478
2

0.022
1.17
0.346

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient
in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10

I. Effect of the Internet on Media Market Structure
Chapter Four presented a strong argument for considering the Internet as a technology
capable of influencing the market structure of the media industry. However, none of the models
discussed in this study have yet to incorporate the adoption rate of this medium. This is because
including Internet adoption in the previously presented models would result in fewer
observations for all variables that would be considered in the models.
Since the Internet is still a relatively new medium that has nevertheless shown rapid
growth in terms of overall adoption, there is a short time period that incorporates the adoption
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pattern of the Internet by the general population. As a result, there are few observations or data
points that show adoption levels for this medium. Indeed, this study shows only a twenty-year
timeframe of Internet adoption, for a total of 19 observations. It is, therefore, prudent to examine
this medium separately. It is also prudent to recognize that any conclusions suggested by an
“Internet-only” model are conditional at best; as the timeframe of consumers’ adoption of the
Internet expands, more observations can be captured and included in the model, which may
increase its validity and predictive strength.
Results of the “Internet-only” model are presented in Table 13, and reaffirm the
incomplete nature of the data. With only 19 data points, the results indicate that the model is not
a good fit estimate of the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent
variable (“Prob > F” = .192). Further, none of the independent variables in the model are
statistically significant predictors of the dependent variable. Interestingly, out of all the models
studied, this model indicates the highest explanatory power (R2 = .2638), although such a finding
is inconclusive yet encouraging at best.
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Table 13. (Model 7). OLS regression estimates for model of Media
Structure with Internet adoption as causal variable.
b
t
Constant
-0.059 -1.19
(0.050)
Change in Internet Adoption Rate [-]
-0.011 -0.11
(0.103)
Change in GDP (Economic Climate) [-]
1.144
1.14
(1.006)
Regulatory Climate [+]
0.085
1.93
(0.044)

N

19

R2
Adjusted R
F
Prob > F

0.2638
2

0.1165
1.79
0.192

Note: T-statistics are based on standard errors.
For each variable, standard errors are indicated under the respective coefficient
in parentheses.
Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the co-efficient.
****prob. <.001
***prob. <.01
**prob. <.05
*prob. < .10
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Chapter Seven
Discussion of Results
One of the objectives of this study has been to develop a model that can be used to
examine the market structure of the media industry as a whole and explain the changes in the
structure as measured by concentration of ownership. As discussed in Chapter Two, previous
studies have established an empirical foundation for the idea that one influencing agent of an
industry’s market structure is technological innovation. Moreover, researchers have studied this
effect of technological innovation specifically on the media industry, although these studies have
focused on individual segments of the media industry, and not by looking at the media as a
whole.
The idea to build upon this body of work in order to examine the relationship between
technological innovation and the market structure of the media industry as a whole is particularly
important now. This is because of the increasing convergence of the media industry, and the
potential concentration of market power that could result from this convergence and
consolidation. Because this convergence trend is still relatively young, the need for a “first
attempt” to develop a model explaining the market structure of the media as a whole is timely.
Certainly, any such “first attempt” should benefit from future examination and revision. The
results of this study, which offers such a “first attempt,” will benefit from such future
examination and revision. Nevertheless, it still offers a positive first step in many respects.
The study has proposed a model that recognizes the potential influence that technological
innovation, general economic conditions, and governmental regulatory policy could have on the
market structure of the media. Chapter Six shows the model leads to inconclusive findings.
Empirical analysis does not conclusively support the idea that radical innovation influences the
market structure of the media industry. The inconclusive findings may be the result of a flawed
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hypothesis as to the nature of the relationship between innovation and media market structure.
Conversely, it is also possible that the inconclusive findings suggest problems with the
construction and operationalization of the variables used to study this relationship. Indeed, this
study provides clues as to how the model could be improved to provide the best level of
explanatory and predictive power desired. All of the models studying changes in the adoption
rate of television and changes in the adoption rate of cable television are reviewed and
summarized in Section A. This review includes a discussion of each variable studied. Rather
than presenting the models in the order in which they were discussed in Chapter Six, they are
presented in an order that highlights those models that offer the most explanatory power.
In addition to offering an adequate level of explanatory power, any model should also be
strongly grounded in a solid theoretical framework. Section B discusses the theoretical strength
of the models examined in Section A, adding to the explanatory power examined in that section.
Section C then examines these models to determine which ones overall (i.e., both
empirically and theoretically) best explain the causal influences of changes in media market
structure. Having identified which model(s) best illustrate the relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent variable, Section C also explores these “best” models to
test this study’s hypotheses, as presented in Chapter Four, with the idea of identifying which of
the models the hypotheses proposed in that chapter are supported.. For Sections A-C, the first
six models reported in Chapter Six will be discussed. These models consider, as independent
variables, both the change in the adoption rate of television as well as the change in the adoption
rate of cable television. The last model—which considers Internet adoption as a causal variable
will be discussed separately in Section D.
The final two sections look beyond the scope of this study. Section E considers future
research initiatives directly related to the model of choice proposed in Section B, specifically
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considering ways in which the model can provide greater explanatory and predictive power.
Section F looks beyond this model to consider other relevant questions related to media market
structure.
A. Assessing Trends in Media Market Structure
Chapter Seven provided evidence that the market structure of the media industry has
experienced different phases and different trends. These results, therefore, show that the media
industry has not been plagued with a constant trend of increasing concentration and diminishing
competition. Likewise, the industry has not always been characterized by consistent period of
increasing competition. Such changes in the direction of the trend reaffirm the importance of
identifying those variables that can act as a catalyst for these changes and influence both the
direction and magnitude of any trends in the market structure of the media industry.
In addition, the results in Chapter Seven indicate that for almost the entire time period of
this study, the market structure of the media has been below the 1500-point level that is
considered to be “moderately concentrated,” and within the range that is considered to be
“unconcentrated.” In other words, when viewing the “media as a whole,” the media industry is
generally characterized by unconcentrated and diverse ownership. Indeed, some points in time
during the early years of this study’s timeframe indicate a market structure that is “moderately
concentrated.” However, these are generally when including the non-media revenues generated
by conglomerates with media operations. Even when including these revenues, the media
industry is considered “unconcentrated” as far back as 1963 and remains as such throughout the
remainder of the study.
B. Assessing Empirical Strengths of the Models
Of the five models considered, only one—Model 2—offers a best fit estimate of the
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (“Prob “F” = .0291, F
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= 2.96). One other—Model 4—approaches a level consistent with being a best fit estimate
(“Prob “F” = .0573, F = 2.47).
Model 2 eliminates the nine conglomerates from consideration in the years 1950-1975 by
assuming market shares of 0%. Not only does this model offer the best fit estimate out of all
models considered; it also finds two of the four causal variables to be statistically significant
predictors of the market structure of the media industry. First, the model gives some support to
the idea that technological innovation influences the market structure of the media by showing
change in the adoption rate of television to be a statistically significant predictor of changes in
media market structure (b=-.755, t=-1.35, p<.10). In addition, the general economic climate as
reflected by changes in GDP also are a statistically significant predictor of changes in media
market structure (b=-1.2, t=-2.32, p<.05.). In this model, neither the change in Cable TV
adoption rate nor the regulatory climate as represented by the political party in power is a
statistically significant independent variable.
The other model that comes close to generating a best fit estimate—Model 4—addresses
market shares for each of the nine conglomerates by assuming a market share during 1950—
1975 timeframe that is equal to its average market share during the 1976—2009 timeframe. This
model also finds two causal variables to be statistically significant predictors of media market
share. As with the prior model, change in economic conditions (GDP) is a statistically
significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=-.757, t=-1.61, p<.10). However,
this model also indicates that change in the adoption rate of cable television is a statistically
significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=-.096, t=-1.00, p<.10). Neither of
the other two hypothesized causal variables—change in the adoption rate of television, or
regulatory environment—is shown to be statistically significant.
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Two additional models offer some empirical power, as each reports one variable that is
statistically significant and each approaches a level consistent with being a best fit estimate.
Each of these models incorporates the unsegmented revenue data for the years 1950-1975;
however, the market shares associated with the nine conglomerates are treated differently.
In one case—Model 5, results of which are reported in Table 11—market shares are
estimated based on the market shares for the years with segmented revenues (i.e., 1975—2009)
and based on a trend during the 1950—2009 timeframe. This model is not a best fit estimate
although it approaches that distinction (“Prob > F” = .0735). The second model—Model 3—
adjusts the market share only for RCA by eliminating the company from consideration during the
1950—1975 timeframe. In this case, the model, while approaching a level consistent with a best
fit model (“Prob > F” = .1017), does not reach the desired level.
For Model 4 and Model 5, only one variable—change in economic condition (GDP)—is
statistically significant. Neither of the variables specifically indicating technological innovation
as measured by adoption rates for new technologies is statistically significant. As in the case of
all of the other two models reviewed, regulatory environment is not a statistically significant
predictor of the dependent variable.
Finally, two of the models examined seem to offer little if any empirical support for the
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. For each of these
models, one causal variable is found to be significant, but neither is a best fit estimate of the
relationship between all of the independent variables and the dependent variable. In one
model—Model 1—revenues for all media companies are included, and no adjustment is made
for the conglomerates during the 1950—1975 period. As a result, non-media revenues are
included in calculating market shares, which leads to skewed measurements of annual market
concentration (i.e., HHI). In this model—results of which are illustrated in Table 4—one causal
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variable, change in economic conditions (GDP), is statistically significant ((b=-1.24, t=-1.57, p
<.10). The F-statistic clearly indicates that this model is not the best estimate of the relationship
which is being studied (“Prob > F” = .4584).
The remaining model—Model 6—considers media-only revenues from all companies in
the study. As a result, the sample size is smaller. In this case, the change in the adoption rate of
cable television is a statistically significant predictor of change in media market structure (b=.355, t=-1.89, p < .05), but, as with Model 1, the F-statistic indicates Model 6 is not the best fit
estimate of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (“Prob > F” =
0.346).

Overall, the varying levels of empirical strength of each of the models supports the idea
that as of yet, the strongest model to explain changes in media market structure has not been
determined. However, each of the two primary independent variables—change in adoption of
television, and change in adoption of cable television—are shown to be statistically significant
predictors in one of the two most empirically sound models respectively. It is not possible to
absolutely conclude that both variables would be statistically significant in any ideal model, but
the results at a minimum provide empirical evidence to justify considering both of these
variables. As will be discussed further in Section H, future attempts to revise, modify and
strengthen any of these models should continue to include both of these variables.
Regarding the control variables, the empirical findings provide clear and strong support
for the idea that changes in economic conditions as measured by GDP is a statistically significant
predictor of changes in media market structure. Only one model—that with the smallest sample
size—did not show this control variable to be statistically significant. The impact of this finding
as it relates to hypothesis testing will be discussed further in Section F, and the implication for
future studies will be discussed further in Section H. The remaining control variable, which
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measured the impact of the general regulatory climate on changes in the market structure of the
media, was not shown to be a statistically significant predictor in any of the models. Such a
consistent finding could lead to a conclusion that regulation does not impact the market structure
of the media. This will be discussed further in Section G.
C. Assessing Theoretical Strengths of the Models
Because of the challenges resulting from the different methodologies used to calculate the
data that was used for this study, the models are based on different theoretical assumptions as to
how best to determine measurements of annual market structure of the media industry. While
Section A compares the different models from an empirical perspective to evaluate the relative
strengths of each, any evaluation of all the models should also include an assessment of which
models are grounded in the strongest theoretical assumptions, or which models avoid weaker
assumptions.
Because Model 6 relies on media-only revenue data, there are no adjustments made to
any of the data. As such, it can be argued that the results are the purest in terms of not being
skewed by extraneous revenues, or by any adjustments used in order to minimize or eliminate the
effect of those extraneous revenues. One of the main weaknesses of this model is the small
sample size (N=32), but this weakness can (and should) eventually be overcome in future studies
by adding additional observations, or in this case, additional years of HHI values based on
subsequent segmented revenue data. Indeed, this model has, as one of its inherent strengths, the
characteristic that its main limitation of a small sample size is probably the easiest in which to
address and overcome. It is this model that found changes in adoption of cable television to be a
statistically significant predictor of change in media market structure.
Of the remaining models, which must all deal with the problematic nature of combining
segmented and unsegmented revenue data, Model 5 seems to offer the most realistic approach to
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addressing the problem of the unsegmented data. This model doesn’t ignore the problem (as
does Model 1), nor does this model completely ignore selected media companies from
consideration for any year or years (as do Models 2 and 3). Rather, it estimates market shares for
nine conglomerates during the years 1950—1975. In doing so, Model 5 recognizes that these
market shares would fluctuate, unlike Model 4, which assume market shares remain constant
year-to-year. Further, the fluctuations that are assumed are based on the actual fluctuations from
year-to-year for each company, when all consolidated revenues are used to measure each
company’s market share. The model, therefore, relies on assumptions that are grounded in the
strongest theoretical foundation for explaining how and why the adjustments were made in order
to address the issue of revenues generated by non-media operations for these nine conglomerates.
In Model 5, as with Model 6 which offers the strongest theoretical foundation of support,
the variable measuring change in the adoption rate of cable television was found to be a
statistically significant predictor of the dependent variable (b=-.096, t=-1.00, p <.10).
Additionally, changes in economic conditions (GDP) were also statistically significant (b=-7.57,
t=-1.61, p<.10) which is contrary to the findings in Model 6, but consistent with the findings in
all of the other models that tested for the effect of changes in the adoption rates of both television
and cable television.
Combined, these two models offer a compelling argument that changes in adoption rate
of cable television, as an example of technological innovation, does influence the changes in the
market structure of the media industry.
As stated earlier in this section, the remaining models, while seeking to provide different
perspectives on how the issue of unsegmented revenues should be address, nevertheless
approach this issue with assumptions that are less realistic and less likely, and therefore do not
offer the same theoretical foundation as offered by Models 5 and 6.
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D. Identifying the Model(s)-of-Choice
In Section A, two models were identified as those which offered the strongest empirical
justification as the model-of-choice for explaining the causes of changes in media market
structure. Similarly, Section B identified two models with the strongest theoretical support for
being the best model to explain the causes of these changes. No single model is judged to be a
model-of-choice by both the empirical and theoretical approaches. As such, focusing on one
model for hypothesis testing purposes requires a more intuitive approach that considers the
empirical and theoretical strengths, but also includes other considerations.
Because each model has some inherent weakness due to the problematic nature of the
revenue data for the 1950-1975 timeframe, one additional consideration when selecting a modelof-choice should be that the model’s inherent weakness can reasonably and convincingly be
overcome in as parsimonious a manner as possible. Regarding the problem data, for example, it
is neither reasonable or realistic to assume that additional information can be obtained that would
result in the ability to accurately identify and segregate media-only revenues for the 1950-1975.
Of the models studied, the one which offers the best opportunity to improve on the
integrity of the data is Model 6, which only considered revenues after 1975 (i.e., segmented
revenues only). The reason for this is that the major weakness of this model is that there are only
32 observations in the sample size. As discussed in Section B, each year of reported earnings
subsequent to this study increases the number of valid observations, and therefore increases the
validity of the model. Section B also recognizes that this model is one of the strongest from a
theoretical perspective, albeit the empirical aspect of this model is weak. Additional
observations should strengthen this aspect of the model, thereby making it a model that should be
used and updated.
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While this model does not represent a best fit estimate of the relationship between the
independent variables and the dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .346), it is of interest to note that
all four models which include adjusted 1950—1975 revenues are shown to be a best fit or
approaching an F-statistic that is consistent with a “best fit” model. This could indicate the
positive impact that additional observations might have on creating a “best fit” model that
provides explanatory and predictive power. It could also reaffirm the importance of making sure
that revenues used are truly media-only revenues, as the model which included unsegmented
revenues was the worst model of all in terms of achieving a best fit.
E. Understanding the Effect of Internet Adoption
As expected, the limited number of observations available to study the pattern of Internet
Adoption makes it difficult to identify any trends or reach any conclusions with respect to the
influence that Internet Adoption has on media market structure. With only 19 observations, we
cannot conclude that the model is a best fit (“Prob > F” = .192). Further, none of the
independent variables show any statistical significance as a predictor of changes in the market
structure of the media industry (see Table 13). Obviously this does not mean that the Internet
specifically, or technological innovation in general, has no influence on the market structure of
the media industry. At best, it merely leaves as undetermined the nature of the relationship
between Internet Adoption and media market structure. As with the models examining the effect
of changes in television adoption and changes in cable TV adoption, a longer timeframe with
additional observations of Internet Adoption rates will be helpful to more accurately identify and
define any affect that Internet Adoption has on media market structure.
F. Hypothesis Testing
As concluded in Section C, Model 6, which relies on segmented revenues only, should be
the “model of choice,” particularly when selecting a model from which to build upon and modify
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in future studies. As such, it is appropriate to first consider Model 6 when testing the hypotheses
proposed in Chapter Four. However, since it is problematic to reach firm conclusions until a
more robust model is developed, it is appropriate to also examine the other models to see if they
provide some indication that might lead to a different conclusion. In essence, the nature of the
“dueling models” experienced in this study suggests that Model 6 should be used to provide an
initial indication as to whether each hypothesis is supported or unsupported, and the other
models should be used to indicate if and how such support may be impacted with the advent of a
more robust model.
Model 6, the “model of choice,” concludes that changes in the adoption rate of television
is not a statistically significant predictor of changes in the market structure of the media industry
(b=-9.43, t=-.04). Accordingly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that changes in the adoption
rate of television do not result in changes in changes in the market structure of the media
industry.
It is important, however, to remember that this independent variable showed virtually no
variation during the 1975—2009 timeframe covered by this model. This is understandable since,
by 1975, over 97% of households had a television. Any meaningful variation in the adoption
rate of television occurred in the 1950’s and 1960’s. By eliminating these two decades from
consideration, Model 6 fails to capture the true trend of the adoption pattern of television, and
thus any meaningful changes from year-to-year during this crucial time. As a result, the
inability to reject H1 is as likely to be caused by the failure to capture television’s true adoption
pattern as it is likely to be caused by the lack of a causal relationship between this independent
variable and the dependent variable of changes in the market structure of the media industry.
The idea that changes in the adoption rate of television might be a statistically significant
predictor of changes in media market structure is supported by the results of Model 2 and Model
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5. Model 2, which eliminates revenues from the nine conglomerates for the 1950—1975 period,
finds changes in the adoption rate of television to be a statistically significant predictor of
changes in the market structure of the media industry (b=-.755, t=-1.35).
Similarly, Model 5, which considers adjusted market shares for these nine conglomerates
that allow for year-to-year fluctuations during the 1950-1975 timeframe, also finds a statistically
significant relationship between this independent variable and the dependent variable (b=-.685,
t=.1.35). Given the conflicting results, and given that the model of choice indicates a statistically
insignificant relationship, it is prudent to conclude that H1 is not supported.
Model 6 also indicates that the adoption rate of cable television is a statistically
significant predictor of changes in the market structure of the media industry (b=-.355, t=-1.89).
As such, despite the limitations previously discussed with regards to this and the other models,
H2 is supported, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that changes in the adoption rate of
cable television do not result in changes in the market structure of the media industry. Moreover,
the results confirm the anticipated positive direction of the relationship between two variables.
Regarding the previously discussed limitations, it should be reiterated that this is the only model
that finds this independent variable to be a statistically significant predictor of the dependent
variable.
To test the final hypothesis (H3), results from Model 7 are utilized. This hypothesis
proposes a causal relationship between changes in the adoption rate of the Internet and changes
in media market structure, The model indicates no statistical significance in the independent
variable (b=-.011, t=-.11). Moreover, neither of the control variables are found to be statistically
significant predictors of the dependent variable, and the model itself is not a good fit estimate of
the relationship between the independent variables (including control variables) and the
dependent variable (“Prob > F” = .192).
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The null hypothesis, which states that changes in the adoption rate of the Internet do not
affect changes in the market structure of the media industry, cannot be rejected. It is likely that
the failure to reject the null hypothesis is due to the small sample size (N=19). As discussed in
Section D, the nature of the relationship between this independent variable and the dependent
variable should be examined when more observations allow for a more statistically acceptable
sample size.
G. Improving the Model through Future Research Initiatives
At a minimum, the discussion in the previous sections in this chapter supports the idea
that future research efforts are warranted to specifically examine the proposed model used in this
study for possible refinement, but also to study the general question of what influences help to
shape the market structure of the media. Indeed, it may be determined that answering the larger,
broader question requires a different approach which ultimately may provide new insight into
how best to refine the model that is examined in this study. Conversely, refining the model
specifically proposed in this study as the preferred model may lead to improved explanatory and
predictive power, which may ultimately help answer the more general questions regarding media
market structure.
The results of this study, while inconclusive in most instances, do nothing to take away
from the theoretical foundation for the idea of a causal relationship between technological
innovation and media market structure. Rather, the empirical basis of this study—reflected in
the inability to develop an adequate sample size of relevant and consistent data—proved to be
the most problematic aspect of developing a solid model of media market structure. In a sense,
the problematic nature of the data is a positive finding because there are several manageable and
practical approaches that can be employed in future studies. At a minimum, it is clear that over
time, future years of media-only revenue data will provide a larger sample size of observations of
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media market structure. As this sample size increases, the need to include early years of
unsegmented data is minimized, and the model will be based on data from one standard data set
with no variations in data collection or reporting methods.
If future studies are to rely on new years of media-only revenue data, it will probably be
necessary to eliminate “Changes in television adoption” as an independent variable. Using
media-only revenue data requires the analysis to begin with the year 1975; by this point, over
97% of American households had television, so there is virtually no variation in this variable
when the timeframe is 1975 and beyond. Without any variation in this variable, it is impossible
to identify any influence that television adoption would have on the variation of any dependent
variable.
Another approach to examining this issue, and yet another opportunity for a future
research endeavor, is to change the way in which the dependent variable is defined and
measured. Doing so would require finding a suitable measure of market structure that can be
used in lieu of calculating a measurement based on market shares, as is the case with the HHI.
The HHI has been shown to be one of the most robust and respectable measures of market
concentration but the problem with the revenue data for the 1950-1975 timeframe makes it
difficult to calculate HHI at enough points in time. Accordingly, there is a compelling reason to
consider other ways to measure market structure without relying on revenue data.
Several studies have defined an industry’s market structure by tracking the number of
firms within an industry (Achs & Audrestch, 1987; Mazzucato, 2000). While there are some
weaknesses with this approach, it nonetheless eliminates the problems experienced in this study
by having to rely on different data sources that use different methods for calculating and
reporting revenue figures for companies with media operations. With this approach, the entire
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1950-2009 timeframe could be studied in a way that relies on using only one approach for
operationalizing media market structure as the dependent variable.
Both of these two approaches are designed to improve the reliability of the model—
through additional observations of the variables by adding subsequent years of observations—
and the validity of the model by incorporating variables that are more accurately and fully
measuring the desired variable (in this case, market structure). Adding additional observations
also increases the degrees of freedom in the model, allowing for additional variables to be
included and considered. For example, future studies should examine the interaction between
variables, in particular the interaction between each of the independent variables and the control
variable of regulatory environment.
It is interesting that none of the models indicated a statistically significant relationship
between the regulatory environment and the dependent variable. This seems counter-intuitive
and contrary to previous work cited in Chapters Two and Five regarding the effect of regulation
on economic conditions in general and market structures in particular. This may be due to the
fact that, indeed, regulation does not have a meaningful and predictable effect on media market
structure. However, the failure to find significant results may simply indicate the need to find a
better way to operationalize the concept of regulation into an appropriate and measureable
variable. Future studies should also consider this opportunity, and explore other ways of
defining regulation in order to measure its effect on the media industry, specifically as it relates
to market structure.
Doing so may create new challenges, including the ability to quantifiably measure a
causal relationship between these variables. Several scholars have, indeed, reported on the effect
of a specific regulation on the media industry, such as the effect of the Newspaper Preservation
Act of 1970 (Martin, 2008). Others have examined how a particular regulation (e.g., The
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Financial Interest and Syndication Rules) has specifically impacted media ownership (Einstein,
2004). While such studies may rely on some type of quantitative analysis, generally the
quantitative aspect of the analysis has been used to define the variables independently of each
other, and not to define or measure a relationship between the variables. These studies show the
difficulty in developing a model that effectively quantifies a causal relationship between the
particular regulation and media market structure. It may be necessary to assess the impact of
regulation on media market structure in a more qualitative or contextual manner; future research
efforts should explore this to properly incorporate the effect of regulation on the market structure
of the media.
H. Additional Research Initiatives
This study—and the proposed future research opportunities identified in Section G—have
focused on examining the market structure of the media industry as a dependent variable in order
to better understand those forces which shape media market structure. When considering
innovation as a potential influencer of the market structure of the media industry, this study has
focused specifically on radical innovations. As discussed in Chapter Three, incremental
innovations may have a distinct and possibly different relationship with respect to media market
structure. Future research efforts should examine this relationship as well.
The question of what effects may result from a concentrated or competitive media
industry are equally compelling. Indeed, one of the reasons many media critics are so concerned
with media market structure is because of the impact that the media industry has on the free
exchange of a diversity of ideas, perspectives, and opinions (Baker, 2007; Nichols &
McChesney, 2009).
Numerous studies have attempted to identify the impact that a concentrated media market
has on the diversity of content produced and distributed by the media industry (Chambers, 2001;
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Drushel, 1998). Results of such studied are varied, reflecting the varied approaches to defining
the problem, as well as indicating an inconclusive nature with respect to resolving the problem.
Such studies will likely continue to be undertaken, but with likely differing results. Future
studies examining the effect of media market structure on content diversity would likely be best
served by attempting to understand under what conditions a concentrated industry leads to
increased content diversity, and under what conditions a concentrated industry leads to decreased
content diversity.
Another possible effect of the market structure of the media industry may be in shaping
the public’s trust of the media. Does a concentrated (or competitive) media industry ultimately
result in the public’s increased trust or distrust? Such a research question would likely require
examining the possibility of intermediate variables. For example, it may be that media market
structure influences media content diversity (as discussed above, possibly under certain
conditions), which includes news content, which in turn affects the public’s trust of the media.
It is also possible that media market structure influences the public’s perception of the
media, which in turn helps shape the public’s level of trust in the media, regardless of any
change in content diversity. Such questions are natural extensions of this study, particularly once
a reliable and valid measurement of media market structure is identified. Moreover, if any
relationship exists between media market structure and the public’s trust in the media, it could
(and should) have implications when considering future media policy initiatives, particularly as it
relates to media ownership issues.
There is some preliminary data showing a strong correlation between a competitive (i.e.,
deconcentrated) media market structure and the public’s trust in the media. Since 1997, Gallup
Polling has conducted frequent surveys designed to measure the public’s trust of the media
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(Morales, 2012).10 Results of those indicating a “great deal” or “fair amount” of trust are
negatively correlated with the level of ownership concentration in the media, as measured by
HHI. Table 14 shows the correlation, and Figure 7 illustrates this relationship over the 13-year
period. To be sure, thirteen observations or measurements of the public’s trust in the media is
too small of a sample size to reach any conclusions. Further, it is clear that a strong correlation
does not in itself support the idea that there is a causal relationship. Nevertheless, such a strong
correlation warrants—at a minimum—a closer look at this relationship in order to further
understand if and how the market structure of the media industry does in fact have an influence
on the level of trust that citizens place in the media.
Table 14. Pearson Correlations: HHI and Media Trust.
Media
HHI
Trust
HHI
1.0000 -0.748*
Media Trust
-0.748* 1.0000
*Correlation is significant at the p<.001 level (two-tailed)

Specifically, the organization has asked the following question: “In general, how much trust and confidence do
you have in the mass media – such as newspapers, TV, and radio – when it comes to reporting the news full,
accurately, and fairly – a great deal , a fair amount, not very much, or none at all?”
10
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Media Trust
HHI

Year

Figure 7. Media Concentration and Media Trust, 1997—2009. (Illustration of the
relationship between media concentration—as measured by HHI, and the public’s
level of trust in the media, as measured by Gallup polls, 1997—2009.)
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Chapter Eight
Conclusion
This study has examined the media industry in order to identify and measure how
technological innovations affect the industry’s market structure. Building upon previous studies
of individual segments within the media industry, this study has approached the research
question in a new way by considering the media industry as a whole. This approach recognizes
the changing nature of the media industry due to convergence of multiple media platforms and
the related horizontal and vertical integration that continues to occur within the industry. Any
new approach to examining a research question generally requires new ways of defining and
operationalizing variables, and new models to incorporate these variables. In examining the
relationship between technological innovation and the market structure of the media industry as a
whole, this study proposes an initial model that can be further refined. This model considers
specific technological innovations that have impacted the media industry over the last 60 years,
while also considering other exogenous variables such as government regulation and economic
conditions as other influences of media market structure.
Results from this study are inconclusive in terms of explaining how technological
innovation influences the market structure of the media industry. At a minimum, the study does
not contradict the idea that technological innovation influences the market structure of the media
industry. Indeed, both TV adoption and Cable TV adoption, as measured by changes in their
respective adoption rates, were found to be statistically significant predictors of media market
structure in at least one variation of the proposed model. Rather, the inconclusive findings point
to the need to find a way to capture more observations of the variables.
Indeed, the multiple models considered in Chapter Six, and the ultimate strength of this
model will come from not just from understanding how technological innovation influences the
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market structure of the media industry, but also how such innovation interacts with other
variables in achieving this influence. Having a more complete understanding of how and why
the market structure of the media industry changes can certainly provide a foundation for
government’s efforts to develop sound media policy, or for businesses looking to make strategic
decisions within the competitive landscape of the media industry. Until then, agencies and
businesses face the risk of making strategic decisions that may be well-intentioned, but
ultimately prove to be problematic and counterproductive. The media industry is full of such
decisions: In 2001 AOL and Time Warner decided that a merger-of-equals was sound business
policy, only to decide eight years later that the merger had failed, and announced the two
operations would split back into two separate companies (Musgrove & Ahrens, 2009). Similarly,
the FCC ultimately concluded that its Financial Interest and Syndication Rules were ineffective
in ensuring competition among producers of media content (Einstein, 2004).
In a sense, the tentative findings resulting from this study could be viewed as consistent
with the work of previous scholars who have concluded that innovation’s effect on market
structures, while present and significant, is best understood in contextual terms, allowing for the
unique characteristics of each innovation, each industry, and each situation. As stated early in
this dissertation, Mansfield acknowledged that an industry could become more concentrated after
the introduction of new technology, but that such an effect would “depend on the nature and
sources of the new technology” (p. 209, 1983). In addition, the words of Scherer presented
earlier are also appropriate. In discussing the debate over Schumpeterian theory, Scherer’s
observation could be extended to the general debate over innovation and market structure when
he noted, “the links between market structure, innovation, and economic welfare are extremely
complex” (p. 1421, 1992). This complexity, however, should not be seen as an excuse to dismiss
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or ignore these links, but rather, as an inspiration and motivation to continue to study and better
understand them.
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Appendix A.
Companies Included in Study
Year Reported: 2009
1. A.H. BELO
2. ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS
CO
3. ANSWERS CORP
4. AOL
5. BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP
6. BELO
7. CABLEVISION
8. CARMIKE CINEMAS INC
9. CBS
10. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC
11. CINEMARK HOLDINGS INC
12. CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP
13. CLEAR CHANNEL
COMMUNICATIONS
14. CLEARWIRE CORP
15. COGENT COMMUNICATIONS GRP
16. COMCAST
17. COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
18. CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS
19. CUMULUS MEDIA INC
20. DAILY JOURNAL CORP
21. DIRECT TV
22. DISCOVERY COMM
23. DISH NETWORK CORPORATION
24. DISNEY
25. DREAMWORKS SKG
26. EARTHLINK INC
27. EMMIS BROADCASTING
28. ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
29. ENTRAVISION
30. FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC
31. GANNETT
32. GATEHOUSE MEDIA INC
33. GENERAL ELECTRIC
34. GOOGLE
35. GRAY TELEVISION
36. IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
37. INTERNET AMERICA INC
38. JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
39. KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
40. LAMAR ADVERTISING
41. LEE ENTERPRISES
42. LIBERTY
43. LIN TV CORP

44. LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP
45. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP
46. MARTHA STEWART LIVING
OMNIMEDIA
47. MCCLATCHY
48. MCGRAW HILL
49. MEDIA GENERAL
50. MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
51. MEREDITH CORP
52. MICROSOFT
53. MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC
54. NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC
55. NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
56. NEWSCORP
57. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP
58. NTN BUZZTIME INC
59. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC
60. PEARSON PLC -ADR
61. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
62. RADIO ONE
63. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC
64. RHI ENTERTAINMENT INC
65. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS -CL A
66. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
67. SALON MEDIA GROUP INC
68. SCHOLASTIC CORP
69. SCRIPPS
70. SCRIPPS NETWORK INTERACTIVE
71. SEVEN ARTS PICTURES PLC
72. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
73. SINCLAIR
74. SIRIUS
75. SONY
76. SUREWEST COMMUNICATIONS
77. THESTREET.COM
78. THOMSON-REUTERS CORP
79. TIME WARNER CABLE
80. TIME WARNER
81. TIVO
82. UNITED ONLINE INC
83. UNIVISION
84. VIACOM
85. VIVENDI
86. WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP

Year Reported: 2009 (cont’d.)
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87. WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE
CO
88. WASHINGTON POST
89. WEBMD HEALTH CORP
90. WESTWOOD ONE

91. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
92. WORLD WRESTLING ENTMT INC
93. YAHOO
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Year Reported: 2005
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

A.H. BELO
ACME COMMUNICATIONS
ADELPHIA
ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS SYS GP
ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS CO
ALLIANCE ATLANTIS COMM -CL B
AMERICAN MEDIA OPERATIONS
ANSWERS CORP
BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP
BELO
CABLEVISION
CARMIKE CINEMAS INC
CBS
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC
CINEMARK HOLDINGS INC
CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP
CKRUSH INC
CLEAR CHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS
CLEARWIRE CORP
CNET NETWORKS INC
COGENT COMMUNICATIONS GRP
COMCAST
COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
COX COMMUNICATIONS
COX RADIO INC -CL A
CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS
CT COMMUNICATIONS INC
CUMULUS MEDIA INC
D & E COMMUNICATIONS INC
DAILY JOURNAL CORP
DIRECT TV
DISCOVERY COMM
DISNEY
DOW JONES
DREAMWORKS SKG
DSL.NET INC
EARTHLINK INC
ECHOSTAR
EMMIS BROADCASTING
ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
ENTRAVISION
EQUITY MEDIA HOLDINGS CORP
FAMILY ROOM ENTMT CORP
FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC
FUSION TELECOMMUNICATIONS
GANNETT

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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GATEHOUSE MEDIA INC
GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC
GENERAL ELECTRIC
GOOGLE
GRANITE BROADCASTING
GRAY TELEVISION
HEARST-ARGYLE
HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP
HOLLINGER
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
IBROADBAND INC
INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS CO
INTERNET AMERICA INC
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
JOURNAL REGISTER CO
KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
KNIGHT RIDDER
LAMAR ADVERTISING
LEE ENTERPRISES
LIBERTY
LIN TV CORP
LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP
LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP
MARTHA STEWART LIVING OMNIMD
MCCLATCHY
MCGRAW HILL
MEDIA GENERAL
MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
MEDIANEWS GROUP INC
MEREDITH CORP
METRO INTL SA -CL B
MICROSOFT
MONARCH SERVICES INC
MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC
NAPSTER INC
NASPERS LTD -ADR
NELSON (THOMAS) INC
NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
NEWSCORP
NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP
NTN BUZZTIME INC
OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC
PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS
PEACE ARCH ENTMT GROUP INC

Year Reported: 2005 (cont’d.)
93. PEARSON PLC -ADR
94. PIXAR
95. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
96. PROTOSOURCE CORP
97. RADIO ONE
98. READERS DIGEST
99. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC
100.
REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR
101.
SAGA COMMUNICATIONS -CL A
102.
SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
103.
SALON MEDIA GROUP INC
104.
SCHOLASTIC CORP
105.
SCRIPPS
106.
SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
107.
SINCLAIR
108.
SIRIUS
109.
SONY
110.
SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC
111.
SUREWEST COMMUNICATIONS
112.
THESTREET.COM
113.
THOMSON CORP
114.
TIME WARNER
115.
TIVO
116.
TRIBUNE CO
117.
UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA -ADR
118.
UNITED ONLINE INC
119.
UNIVISION
120.
VIACOM
121.
VIVENDI
122.
WARNER MUSIC GROUP CORP
123.
WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE CO
124.
WASHINGTON POST
125.
WEBMD HEALTH CORP
126.
WESTWOOD ONE
127.
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
128.
WORLD WRESTLING ENTMT INC
129.
XANADOO CO
130.
XM SATELLITE
131.
YAHOO
132.
YOUNG BROADCASTING
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Year Reported: 2000
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

ACKERLEY GROUP INC
ACME COMMUNICATIONS
ADELPHIA
ALASKA COMMUNICATIONS SYS
GP
ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS
CO
ALLIANCE ATLANTIS COMM -CL B
AMERICA ONLINE
AMERICAN LAWYER MEDIA INC
AMERICAN RADIO SYS CORP-CL A
ARAHOVA COMMUNICATIONSC-1
ASCENT ENTERTAINMENT GROUP
ASK JEEVES INC
AT&T
BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP
BELO
BENEDEK COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
BERTLESMANN
BIG CITY RADIO INC -CL A
BRILL MEDIA CO LLC
CABLEVISION
CARMIKE CINEMAS INC
CHANCELLOR BROADCSTNG -CL
A
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS INC
CHRIS CRAFT
CINCINNATI BELL INC
CINEMARK USA INC
CINEMASTAR LUXURY THEATERS
CITADEL BROADCASTING CORP
CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC
CLASSIC COMMUNICATIONS INC
CLEAR CHANNEL
COMMUNICATIONS
CNET NETWORKS INC
COMCAST
COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
COX COMMUNICATIONS
COX RADIO INC -CL A
CROWN MEDIA HOLDINGS
CT COMMUNICATIONS INC
CTN MEDIA GROUP INC
CUMULUS MEDIA INC
DAILY JOURNAL CORP
DISCOVERY COMM
DISNEY
DOW JONES

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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DSL.NET INC
EARTHLINK INC
EASYRIDERS INC
ECHOSTAR
ELEPHANT TALK COMM INC
EMMIS BROADCASTING
ENTERCOM COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
ENTRAVISION
EZ COMMUNICATIONS INC -CL A
FAMILY ROOM ENTMT CORP
FASTNET CORP
FILM ROMAN INC
FIRST LOOK MEDIA INC
FISHER COMMUNICATIONS INC
GANNETT
GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC
GENERAL ELECTRIC
GENERAL MEDIA INC
GENERAL MOTORS
GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GOOGLE
GRANITE BROADCASTING
GRAY TELEVISION
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HEARST CORPORATION
HEARST-ARGYLE
HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP
HIGH SPEED ACCESS CORP
HISPANIC BROADCASTING -CL A
HISPANIC TV NETWORK INC
HOLLINGER
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
HUNGRY MINDS INC
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
INFINITY BROADCASTING -CL A
INSIGHT COMMUNICATIONS CO
INTEGRITY MEDIA INC
INTERMEDIA MKTG SOLUTNS INC
INTERNET AMERICA INC
INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC -CL A
ITC DELTACOM INC
JAMES CABLE PARTNERS LP
JONES MEDIA NETWORKS LTD
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
JOURNAL REGISTER CO
KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
KNIGHT RIDDER

Year Reported: 2000 (cont’d.)
93. KUSHNER LOCKE CO
94. LAMAR ADVERTISING
95. LAS AMERICAS BROADBAND INC
96. LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP
97. LEE ENTERPRISES
98. LIBERTY
99. LIN TV CORP
100. LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT CP
101. LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP
102. MARKETWATCH INC
103. MARTHA STEWART LIVING
OMNIMD
104. MCCLATCHY
105. MCGRAW HILL
106. MEDIA GENERAL
107. MEDIACOM COMMUNICATIONS
CORP
108. MEDIANEWS GROUP INC
109. MEREDITH CORP
110. METRO GLOBAL MEDIA INC
111. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC
112. METRO INTL SA -CL B
113. MILLBROOK PRESS INC
114. MONARCH SERVICES INC
115. MORRIS PUBLISHING GRP LLC
116. NELSON (THOMAS) INC
117. NEW FRONTIER MEDIA INC
118. NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
119. NEWS COMMUNICATIONS
120. NEWSCORP
121. NEXSTAR BROADCASTING GROUP
122. NEXTMEDIA OPERATING INC
123. NORTHLAND CABLE TELEVISION
124. NTN BUZZTIME INC
125. NUCENTRIX BROADBAND
NETWORKS
126. ON COMMAND CORP
127. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC
128. PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS
129. PEARSON PLC -ADR
130. PEGASUS
131. PIXAR
132. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
133. PROTOSOURCE CORP
134. PULITZER
135. RADIO ONE
136. RAINBOW MEDIA GROUP
137. RAYCOM MEDIA
138. READERS DIGEST

139. REGENT COMMUNICATIONS INC
140. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR
141. RNETHEALTH INC
142. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS -CL A
143. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
144. SALON MEDIA GROUP INC
145. SCHOLASTIC CORP
146. SCRIPPS
147. SEAGRAM'S
148. SFX BROADCASTING INC -CL A
149. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
150. SINCLAIR
151. SONY
152. SPECTRASITE INC
153. SPORTSLINE.COM INC
154. STC BROADCASTING INC
155. SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC
156. SUSQUEHANNA MEDIA CO
157. TEAM COMMUNICATIONS GROUP
158. TERRA NETWORKS SA -ADR
159. THESTREET.COM
160. THOMSON CORP
161. TIME WARNER
162. TIMES MIRROR
163. TIVO
164. TM CENTURY INC
165. TRIATHLON BROADCST CO -CL A
166. TRIBUNE CO
167. TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC
168. TV GUIDE INC
169. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA -ADR
170. UNITED ONLINE INC
171. UNITED TELEVISION INC
172. UNIVISION
173. VIACOM
174. VIVENDI
175. WARWICK VALLEY TELEPHONE
CO
176. WASHINGTON POST
177. WEBMD HEALTH CORP
178. WESTWOOD ONE
179. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
180. WORLD WRESTLING ENTMT INC
181. WRC MEDIA INC
182. XANADOO CO
183. YAHOO
184. YOUNG BROADCASTING
185. ZIFF DAVIS MEDIA INC
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Year Reported:1995
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

ACKERLEY GROUP INC
ADELPHIA
ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS
ALLBRITTON COMMUNICATIONS CO
AMERICA ONLINE
AMERICAN MEDIA INC -CL A
AMERICAN TELECASTING INC
AMFM INC
ARGYLE
ASCENT ENTERTAINMENT GROUP
BEASLEY BROADCAST GROUP
BELO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
BERTLESMANN
BET HOLDINGS INC -CL A
BIG CITY RADIO INC -CL A
BOX WORLDWIDE INC
BRILL MEDIA CO LLC
CABLE MICHIGAN INC
CABLEMAXX HOLDINGS INC
CABLEVISION
CABLEVISION INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC
CARMIKE CINEMAS INC
CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS -CL A
CENTURY COMMUN -CL A
CHRIS CRAFT
CINEMARK USA INC
CINEMASTAR LUXURY THEATERS
CINERGI PICTURES ENTMT INC
CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC
CLASSIC COMMUNICATIONS INC
CLEAR CHANNEL
COMMUNICATIONS
CNET NETWORKS INC
COMCAST
COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER
COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
CONTINENTAL CBLVISION -CL A
COWLES MEDIA CO -COM
COX COMMUNICATIONS
COX RADIO INC -CL A
CTN MEDIA GROUP INC
DAILY JOURNAL CORP
DISCOVERY COMM
DISNEY
DOW JONES
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EARTHLINK INC
EMMIS BROADCASTING
ENTRAVISION
FILM ROMAN INC
FIRST NATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT
FOUR MEDIA CO
GANNETT
GARDEN STATE NEWSPAPERS
GENERAL ELECTRIC
GENERAL MEDIA INC
GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT
GOLDWYN (SAMUEL) CO
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GRANITE BROADCASTING
GRAY TELEVISION
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HEARST CORPORATION
HEARST-ARGYLE
HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP
HISPANIC BROADCASTING -CL A
HOLLINGER
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
IAC/INTERACTIVECORP
INFINITY BROADCASTING -CL A
INFINITY MEDIA
INTEGRITY MEDIA INC
INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC -CL A
INTL FAMILY ENTERTAIN -CL B
JACOR COMMUNICATIONS
JONES INTERCABLE -LP-CL A
JONES MEDIA NETWORKS LTD
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC
KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
KNIGHT RIDDER
KUSHNER LOCKE CO
LAMAR ADVERTISING
LANCIT MEDIA ENTMT LTD
LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP
LEE ENTERPRISES
LIBERTY
LIN TV CORP
LIVE ENTERTAINMENT
LODGENET INTERACTIVE CORP
MCCLATCHY
MCGRAW HILL

Year Reported: 1995 (cont’d.)
138. SOUTHERN STARR BROADCASTG
GP
139. SPECTRAVISION INC
140. SPELLING ENTMT INC -CL A
141. SPICE ENTERTAINMENT COS INC
142. SPORTS MEDIA INC
143. SPORTSLINE.COM INC
144. STECK-VAUGHN PUBLISHING CP
145. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
146. SUNGROUP INC
147. SUN-TIMES MEDIA GROUP INC
148. SUSQUEHANNA MEDIA CO
149. TCA CABLE TV INC
150. TCI
151. TELEMUNDO GROUP INC -CL A
152. TESCORP INC
153. THOMSON CORP
154. TIME WARNER ENTERTAINMENT
155. TIME WARNER
156. TIMES MIRROR
157. TM CENTURY INC
158. TRIBUNE CO
159. TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC
160. TURNER BROADCASTING -CL B
161. TV FILME INC
162. TV GUIDE INC
163. UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA -ADR
164. UNITED TELEVISION INC
165. UNIVISION
166. US SATELLITE BROADCST -CL A
167. VIACOM
168. WASHINGTON POST
169. WAVERLY INC
170. WESTINGHOUSE
171. WESTWOOD ONE
172. WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
173. WIRELESS CABLE ATLANTA INC
174. WIRELESS ONE INC
175. XANADOO CO
176. YAHOO
177. YOUNG BROADCASTING

93. MEDIA GENERAL
94. MEDIAONE GROUP INC
95. MERCOM INC
96. MEREDITH CORP
97. METRO GLOBAL MEDIA INC
98. METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC
99. MONARCH SERVICES INC
100. NELSON (THOMAS) INC
101. NEW WORLD TELEVISION INC
102. NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
103. NEWS COMMUNICATIONS
104. NEWSCORP
105. NORTHLAND CABLE TELEVISION
106. NOSTALGIA NETWORK INC
107. NTN BUZZTIME INC
108. NUCENTRIX BROADBAND
NETWORKS
109. NYNEX CABLECOMM GP PLC ADR
110. ON COMMAND CORP
111. OUTDOOR CHANNEL HLDGS INC
112. OUTLET COMMUNICATION -CL A
113. PAXSON COMMUNICATIONS
114. PEGASUS
115. PEOPLES CHOICE TV CORP
116. PIXAR
117. PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
118. POLYGRAM NV -ADR
119. PROVIDENCE JOURNAL CO -CL A
120. PULITZER
121. RADIO ONE
122. RAYCOM MEDIA
123. READERS DIGEST
124. REGAL CINEMAS INC
125. RENAISSANCE COMMUNICATNS
CP
126. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR
127. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
128. SAGA COMMUNICATIONS -CL A
129. SALEM COMMUNICATIONS CORP
130. SAVOY PICTURES ENTMT INC
131. SBC TECHNOLOGIES INC/DEL
132. SCHOLASTIC CORP
133. SCRIPPS
134. SEAGRAM'S
135. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
136. SINCLAIR
137. SONY
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Year Reported: 1990
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

21ST CENTURY FILM CORP
ACKERLEY GROUP INC
ADELPHIA
AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS
ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS
AMERICAN CITY BUS JOURNALS
AMERICAN COMMUN & TV
AMERICAN MEDIA INC -CL A
AMERICAN SCREEN CO
AMERICAN TV & COMMUN -CL A
BAKER COMMUNICAITONS
BELO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
BOX WORLDWIDE INC
BURNHAM BROADCASTING CO -LP
CABLEVISION
CABLEVISION INDUSTRIES CORP
CANNON PICTURES INC
CAPITAL CITIES/ABC
CARMIKE CINEMAS INC
CAROLCO PICTURES INC
CBS
CC MEDIA HOLDINGS (CLR CHNL)
CCH INC -CL A
CENTRAL NEWSPAPERS -CL A
CENTURY COMMUN -CL A
CHRIS CRAFT
CLARK (DICK) PRODUCTIONS INC
COMCAST
COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER
COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
CONTINENTAL CBLVISION -CL A
DAILY JOURNAL CORP
DANIELS & ASSOCIATES INC
DISNEY
DOW JONES
EMMIS BROADCASTING
FILMSTAR INC
FRIES ENTERTAINMENT INC
GALAXY CABLEVISION -LP
GANNETT
GENERAL ELECTRIC
GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GRANITE BROADCASTING
GRAY TELEVISION
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HECTOR COMMUNICATIONS CORP
HOLDEN-DAY INC
HOLLINGER
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
IMAGINE FILMS ENMT INC
INFINITY BROADCASTING -CL A
INTERVISUAL BOOKS INC -CL A
INTL BROADCAST SYSTEMS -CL A
JACOR COMMUNICATIONS
JONES INTERCABLE -LP-CL A
JONES SPACELINK LTD -CL A
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC
KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
KNIGHT RIDDER
KUSHNER LOCKE CO
LASER-PACIFIC MEDIA CORP
LEE ENTERPRISES
MCCLATCHY
MCGRAW HILL
MEDIA GENERAL
MERCOM INC
MERCURY ENTERTAINMENT CORP
MEREDITH CORP
METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC
MILLICOM INC
MULTIMEDIA
NELSON (THOMAS) INC
NEW CENTURY COMMUNCTN -CL A
NEW LINE CINEMA CORP
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
NEWS COMMUNICATIONS
NEWSCORP
NOSTALGIA NETWORK INC
NTN BUZZTIME INC
ORION PICTURES CORP
OSBORN COMMUNICATIONS
OUTLET COMMUNICATION -CL A
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS
INC
PARK COMMUNICATIONS INC
PAUL ENTERTAINMENT INC
PINELANDS INC
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
PLAZA COMMUNICATIONS INC

Year Reported: 1990 (cont’d.)
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

93. POLYGRAM NV -ADR
94. POLYMUSE INC
95. PRICE/STERN/SLOAN INC
96. PULITZER
97. QUEEN CITY BROADCASTING INC
98. READERS DIGEST
99. REPUBLIC PICTURES
100. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR
101. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
102. SBC TECHNOLOGIES INC/DEL
103. SCHOLASTIC CORP
104. SCI TELEVISION INC -CL B
105. SCRIPPS
106. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
107. SHOP TELEVISION NETWORK INC
108. SOUTHERN STARR BROADCASTG
GP
109. SPECTRAVISION INC
110. SPELLING ENTMT INC -CL A
111. SPORTS MEDIA INC
112. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
113. SUNGROUP INC
114. TCA CABLE TV INC
115. TCI

122

TELEMUNDO GROUP INC -CL A
THOMSON CORP
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
TM CENTURY INC
TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC
TRIBUNE CO
TRIBUNE/SWAB-FOX COS -CL A
TRIMARK HOLDINGS INC
TURNER BROADCASTING -CL B
TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA -ADR
UNITED TELEVISION INC
VIACOM
VIDCOM POST INC
VISTA ORGANIZATION LTD
WASHINGTON POST
WAVERLY INC
WESTWOOD ONE
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A

Year Reported: 1985
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

ACKERLEY GROUP INC
ADDISON-WESLEY PUB -CL B
AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS
ALL AMERICAN COMMUNICATIONS
AMERICAN CABLESYSTEMS -CL A
AMERICAN CITY BUS JOURNALS
AMERICAN COMMUN & TV
AMERICAN NATL ENTERPRISES
AMERICAN TV & COMMUN -CL A
ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC
BAKER COMMUNICAITONS
BELO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
CABLEVISION
CAPITAL CITIES
CARDIFF COMMUNICATIONS-OLD
CAROLCO PICTURES INC
CBS
CC MEDIA HOLDINGS (CLR CHNL)
CCH INC -CL A
CHRIS CRAFT
CITIZENS CABLE COMM INC
COMCAST
COMMONWLTH TELE ENTER
COMTEX NEWS NETWORK INC
CONTINENTAL CBLVISION -CL A
DAILY JOURNAL CORP
DE LAURENTIIS FILM PTRS -LP
DISNEY
DOW JONES
EMMIS BROADCASTING
ESSEX COMMUNICATIONS -CL A
FIRST AMERI-CABLE CORP
FIRST CAROLINA COMMUNICATNS
FOUR STAR INTERNATIONAL INC
FRIES ENTERTAINMENT INC
G. G. COMMUNICATIONS INC
GANNETT
GOLDEN BOOKS FAMILY ENTMT
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GRAY TELEVISION
GROLIER INC
GUBER-PETERS ENTMT
HALMI (ROBERT) INC
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INCF-26

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

123

HOLDEN-DAY INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
INFINITY BROADCASTING -CL A
INFLIGHT SERVICES INC
JACOR COMMUNICATIONS
JONES SPACELINK LTD -CL A
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
KING WORLD PRODUCTIONS INC
KINGS ROAD ENTERTAINMENT
KNIGHT RIDDER
LAUREL ENTERTAINMENT INC
LEE ENTERPRISES
LORIMAR
MACMILLAN INC
MALRITE COMMUNICATNS
MCA INC
MCGRAW HILL
MCI INC
MCS TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC
MEDIA GENERAL
MEDIA HORIZIONS -CL A
MERCURY ENTERTAINMENT CORP
MEREDITH CORP
METRO GOLDWYN MAYER INC
MGM UA ENTERTAINMENT CO
MIZLOU COMMUNICATIONS
MULTIMEDIA
NATIONAL LAMPOON INC -OLD
NELSON (THOMAS) INC
NEW LINE CINEMA CORP
NEW STAR ENTERTAINMENT INC
NEW VISIONS ENMNT CORP
NEW WORLD ENTERTNMNT
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
NORTH AMER COMM CORP-NEW
ORION PICTURES CORP
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS
INC
PARK COMMUNICATIONS INC
PEREGRINE ENTERTAINMENT LTD
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
PLAZA COMMUNICATIONS INC
POLYMUSE INC
PRICE/STERN/SLOAN INC
PULITZER
RCA

Year Reported: 1985 (cont’d.)
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

93. REPUBLIC PICTURES
94. REUTERS PLC(GBR)-ADR
95. ROLLINS COMMUNICATIONS INC
96. SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
97. SCHOLASTIC CORP
98. SCOTT CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
99. SCRIPPS
100. SHENANDOAH TELECOMMUN CO
101. SPECTRAVISION INC
102. SPELLING ENTMT INC -CL A
103. STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
104. SUNGROUP INC
105. TAFT BROADCASTING CO
106. TCA CABLE TV INC
107. TCI
108. TELECAST INC
109. TELEPICTURES CORP
110. TELSTAR CORP
111. TIME WARNER
112. TIMES MIRROR
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TM CENTURY INC
TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC
TRI STAR PICTURES INC
TRIBUNE CO
TRIBUNE/SWAB-FOX COS -CL A
TURNER BROADCASTING -CL B
TVX BROADCAST GROUP
TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNITED CABLE TELEVISION
UNITED TELEVISION INC
VESTRON INC
VISTA ORGANIZATION LTD
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WASHINGTON POST
WAVERLY INC
WESTWOOD ONE
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
ZONDERVAN CORP

Year Reported: 1980
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

ABKCO INDUSTRIES INC
ACKERLEY GROUP INC
ADDISON-WESLEY PUB -CL B
AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS
ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AMERICAN NATL ENTERPRISES
ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC
ATHENA COMMUNICATIONS CORP
ATLANTIC TELECASTING CORP
BELO
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY
CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES
CARDIFF COMMUNICATIONS-OLD
CBS
CCH INC -CL A
CHRIS CRAFT
COMCAST
COMMONWEALTH THEATRES
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD
DISNEY
DIVERSIFIED MEDIA INC
DOW JONES
FOUR STAR INTERNATIONAL INC
G. G. COMMUNICATIONS INC
GANNETT
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GRAY TELEVISION
GROLIER INC
GROVE PRESS INC
GUBER-PETERS ENTMT
HALMI (ROBERT) INC
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INCF-26
HARTE-HANKS CABLE INC
HOLDEN-DAY INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
INFLIGHT SERVICES INC
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
KNIGHT RIDDER
LEE ENTERPRISES
MACMILLAN INC

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
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MAPLE PRESS CO
MCA INC
MCGRAW HILL
MCI INC
MEDIA GENERAL
MEREDITH CORP
METROMEDIA INC
MGM UA ENTERTAINMENT CO
MID-AMERICA PUBLISHING CORP
MULTIMEDIA
NATIONAL LAMPOON INC -OLD
NELSON (THOMAS) INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
NEW YORKER MAGAZINE INC
NORTH AMERICAN PUBLISHING CO
ORION PICTURES CORP
PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS
INC
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES
POST CORP
RCA
SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
SCHOLASTIC CORP
SCRIPPS
SPECTRAVISION INC
SPELLING ENTERTNMT GRP INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
SUNGROUP INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TCI
TELEPICTURES CORP
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
TPC COMMUNICATIONS INC
TURNER BROADCASTING -CL B
TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNITED CABLE TELEVISION
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WASHINGTON POST
WAVERLY INC
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
ZONDERVAN CORP

Year Reported: 1975
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

ABC INDS INC
ABKCO INDUSTRIES INC
ACTON CORP -OLD
ADAMS RUSSELL
ADDISON-WESLEY PUB -CL B
AFFILIATED PUBLICATIONS
ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AMERICAN TV & COMMUN -CL A
ARCHIE ENTERPRISES INC
ASI COMMUNICATIONS INC
ATHENA COMMUNICATIONS CORP
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC
BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS
C V INTERNATIONAL CORP
CABLECOM GENERAL INC
CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES
CBS
CCH INC -CL A
CHILTON CO
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
CINEMA 5 LTD
CINERAMA INC
COMCAST
COMMONWEALTH THEATRES
COMMUNICATIONS PROPERTIES
CONESTOGA ENTERPRISES
CORDURA CORP
COWLES COMMUNICATIONS
COX CABLE COMMUNICATIONS INC
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD
DISNEY (WALT) CO
DIVERSIFIED MEDIA INC
DOW JONES
FUTURE COMMUNICATIONS
GANNETT
GOODHEART-WILLCOX CO INC
GRAY TELEVISION
GROLIER INC
GROSS TELECASTING
GROVE PRESS INC
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC
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HARTE-HANKS CABLE INC
HOLDEN-DAY INC
HOLIDAY THEATRES INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
ILLUSTRATED WORLD ENCYCLOPDA
INFLIGHT SERVICES INC
JOURNAL COMMUNICATIONS INC
KANSAS STATE NETWORK INC
KNIGHT RIDDER
LEE ENTERPRISES
LIBERTY CORP
LIN BROADCASTING
LIPPINCOTT (J B) CO
MACMILLAN INC
MAPLE PRESS CO
MCGRAW HILL
MEDIA GENERAL -CL A
MEREDITH CORP
METROMEDIA INC
MID-AMERICA PUBLISHING CORP
MULTIMEDIA
NATIONAL LAMPOON INC -OLD
NELSON (THOMAS) INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
NEW YORKER MAGAZINE INC
NORTH AMERICAN PUBLISHING CO
PANAX CORP
PLAYBOY ENTERPRISES -CL B
POST CORP
PRENTICE-HALL INC
RAHALL COMMUNICATIONS CORP
RCA
REEVES TELECOM CORP
SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
SCHOLASTIC CORP
SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING
SONDERLING BROADCASTING CORP
SPEIDEL NEWSPAPERS INC
STARR BROADCASTING GROUP INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
SUNGROUP INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TCI
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
TURNER BROADCASTING -CL B

Year Reported: 1975 (cont’d.)
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

UA COLUMBIA CABLEVISION
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNITED CABLE TELEVISION
VISION CABLE COMMUN -CL A
WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WASHINGTON POST
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WAVERLY INC
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A
WJDX INC
WOODS COMMUNICATION CORP

Year Reported: 1970
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

ACTON CORP -OLD
ADAMS RUSSELL
ADDISON-WESLEY PUB -CL B
ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AMERICAN TV & COMMUN -CL A
BANTAM BOOKS INC
BARTELL MEDIA CORP
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC
CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES
CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC
CBS
CCH INC -CL A
CHILTON CO
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC
CINEMA 5 LTD
CINERAMA INC
COLLINS RADIO CO
COMMUNICATIONS PROPERTIES
CORDURA CORP
COWLES COMMUNICATIONS
COX CABLE COMMUNICATIONS INC
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD
DISNEY (WALT) CO
DOW JONES
ESQUIRE INC
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC
GANNETT
GRAY TELEVISION
GROLIER INC
GROSS TELECASTING
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN CO
INFLIGHT SERVICES INC
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IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC
KNIGHT RIDDER
LEE ENTERPRISES
LIN BROADCASTING
MACMILLAN INC
MCGRAW HILL
MEDIA GENERAL -CL A
MEREDITH CORP
METROMEDIA INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
OUTLET CO
POST CORP
PRENTICE-HALL INC
PUTNAMS (G P) SONS
RCA
REEVES TELECOM CORP
RIDDER PUBLICATIONS INC
SADLIER (WILIAM H.) INC
SCHOLASTIC CORP
SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING
SFN COS INC
SIMON & SCHUSTER
SONDERLING BROADCASTING CORP
STARR BROADCASTING GROUP INC
STERLING COMMUNICATIONS INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TCI
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR
WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC
WALTER READE ORGANIZATN INC
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
WHDH CORP
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A

Year Reported: 1965
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

ACTON CORP -OLD
ADAMS RUSSELL
ADDISON-WESLEY PUB -CL B
ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
BARTELL MEDIA CORP
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
BOOTH NEWSPAPERS INC
CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES
CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC
CBS
CCH INC -CL A
CHILTON CO
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC
CINERAMA INC
COLLINS RADIO CO
COWLES COMMUNICATIONS
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC -OLD
CURTIS PUBLISHING CO
DISNEY (WALT) CO
DOW JONES
ESQUIRE INC
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC
GOODWAY INC
GROLIER INC
GROSS TELECASTING
H & B AMERICAN CORP
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC
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IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC
JUBILEE INDS INC
LIN BROADCASTING
MACMILLAN INC
MCCALL CORP
MCGRAW HILL
MEDIA GENERAL -CL A
MEREDITH CORP
METROMEDIA INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
OUTLET CO
PRENTICE-HALL INC
RCA
REEVES TELECOM CORP
SCRIPPS HOWARD BROADCASTING
SFN COS INC
SIMON & SCHUSTER
STERLING COMMUNICATIONS INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TCI
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
TRANS-BEACON CORP
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR
WADSWORTH PUBLISHING CO INC
WALTER READE ORGANIZATN INC
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
WHDH CORP
WILEY (JOHN) & SONS -CL A

Year Reported: 1960
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
CADENCE INDUSTRIES CORP
CAPITAL CITIES
CAPITOL INDS-EMI INC
CBS
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER INC
CINERAMA INC
COLLINS RADIO CO
COWLES COMMUNICATIONS
CURTIS PUBLISHING CO
DISNEY (WALT) CO
ESQUIRE INC
FEDERATED PUBLICATIONS INC
GOODWAY INC
GROLIER INC
H & B AMERICAN CORP
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARCOURT GENERAL INC
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

IRWIN (RICHARD D) INC
JUBILEE INDS INC
MACMILLAN INC
MCGRAW HILL
MEREDITH CORP
METROMEDIA INC
NEW YORK TIMES CO -CL A
OUTLET CO
PRENTICE-HALL INC
RCA
REEVES TELECOM CORP
SFN COS INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
TRANS-BEACON CORP
UNITED ARTISTS ENT -CL A
UNIVERSAL PUBLISHING & DISTR
WARNER COMMUNICATIONS INC
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
WHDH CORP

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

MACMILLAN INC
MCGRAW HILL
MEREDITH CORP
SFN COS INC
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
TIME WARNER
TIMES MIRROR
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
WHDH CORP

Year Reported: 1955
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

ALLYN & BACON INC
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
COLLINS RADIO CO
CURTIS PUBLISHING CO
DISNEY (WALT) CO
GROLIER INC
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
HARPER & ROW PUBLISHERS INC
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Year Reported: 1950
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

RCA
TIME WARNER
CURTIS PUBLISHING CO
CBS
AMERICAN BROADCASTING
MACMILLAN INC
CHRIS-CRAFT INDS
MCGRAW HILL
WESTERN PUBLISHING INC
TIMES MIRROR
MEREDITH CORP
GROLIER INC
WHDH CORP
SFN COS INC
BOOK-OF-THE-MONTH CLUB INC
COLLINS RADIO CO
DISNEY (WALT) CO
STORER COMMUNICATIONS INC
HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH
TAFT BROADCASTING CO
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Appendix B.
HHI Concentration Ratios for the Media Industry
Year
1950

HHI
2097.47

Year
1980

HHI
498.328

1951

1899.11

1981

495.352

1952

1880.01

1982

456.004

1953

1959.95

1983

420.987

1954

2049.59

1984

429.587

1955

2026.73

1985

381.868

1956

1948.64

1986

351.804

1957

1812.05

1987

328.81

1958

1771.78

1988

330.028

1959

1808.88

1989

373.854

1960

1511.2

1990

410.114

1961

1466.65

1991

416.34

1962

1500.63

1992

404.023

1963

1357.38

1993

378.772

1964

1178.53

1994

356.673

1965

1187.56

1995

359.465

1966

1183.62

1996

374.731

1967

1229.16

1997

374.228

1968

1074.32

1998

348.325

1969

956.509

1999

377.59

1970

947.783

2000

365.884

1971

987.398

2001

469.968

1972

916.128

2002

467.906

1973

892.659

2003

487.4

1974

889.384

2004

523.847

1975

911.142

2005

490.199

1976

497.811

2006

531.208

1977

525.785

2007

553.92

1978

501.171

2008

586.235

1979

500.701

2009

497.124
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Appendix C.
Adoption Rates for Television, Cable Television, and the Internet,
1950—2009

Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

TV
CATV
Internet
Adoption Adoption Adoption
Rate
Rate
Rate
12
24
39
56.8
58.1
67.2
0.5
76
0.9
83
0.9
84.5
1.1
86
1.3
88
1.4
89
1.5
90
1.7
91.5
1.9
93
2.1
92
2.4
93
2.9
94
3.8
95
4.4
95
6.1
96
7.6
96
9.2
96
9.7
96
11.3
97
12.4
97.1
13.6642
97.4
14.8215
97.4
16.0503
97.6
17.0985
97.7
18.2335
97.9
19.5935

Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
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TV
CATV
Internet
Adoption Adoption Adoption
Rate
Rate
Rate
97.7 18.2335
97.9 19.5935
98
22.2174
98
29
98
37.2
98
41.2
98
44.6
98
46.8
98
48.7
98.1
49.4
98.2
52.8
98.2
56.4
0.8
98.2
58.9
1.19
98.3
60.2
1.75
98.3
61.4
2.31
98.3
62.4
4.974
98.3
63.4
9.39
98.2
65.3
16.37
98.2
66.5
22.01
98.2
67.2
30.66
98.2
67.5
36.55
98.2
68
43.94
98.2
68
50.1
98.2
69.4
60.5
98.2
69.8
63.1
98.2
68.1
66.26
98.2
67.5
69.57
98.2
72.4
70.57
98.2
69.3
73.52
98.2
61.6
75.77
78.14

Appendix D
Control Variables—Regulatory Climate and Annual GDP
Year

Regulatory
Climate

Year

Regulatory
Climate

1950

0

293.7

1980

0

2788.1

1951

0

339.3

1981

1

3126.8

1952

0

358.3

1982

1

3253.2

1953

1

379.3

1983

1

3534.6

1954

1

380.4

1984

1

3930.9

1955

1

414.7

1985

1

4217.5

1956

1

437.4

1986

1

4460.1

1957

1

461.1

1987

1

4736.4

1958

1

467.2

1988

1

5100.4

1959

1

506.6

1989

1

5482.1

1960

1

526.4

1990

1

5800.5

1961

0

544.8

1991

1

5992.1

1962

0

585.7

1992

1

6342.3

1963

0

617.8

1993

0

6667.4

1964

0

663.6

1994

0

7085.2

1965

0

719.1

1995

0

7414.7

1966

0

787.7

1996

0

7838.5

1967

0

832.4

1997

0

8332.4

1968

0

909.8

1998

0

8793.5

1969

1

984.4

1999

0

9353.5

1970

1

1038.3

2000

0

9951.5

1971

1

1126.8

2001

1

10286.2

1972

1

1237.9

2002

1

10642.3

1973

1

1382.3

2003

1

11142.2

1974

1

1499.5

2004

1

11853.3

1975

1

1637.7

2005

1

12623

1976

1

1824.6

2006

1

13377.2

1977

0

2030.1

2007

1

14028.7

1978

0

2293.8

2008

1

14369.1

1979

0

2562.2

2009

0

13939

GDP

GDP

For “Regulatory Climate” a ‘1’ indicates the federal government was led by a Republican
administration; a ‘0’ indicates the federal government was not led by a Republican administration.
For “GDP”: Data Source” http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/
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Appendix E
Descriptive Statistics

Observations
Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
Low
Range
High

HHI
60
871.84
524
577.64
328.81
2097.47

Cable
TV
TV
Internet
Regulatory
Adoption Adoption Adoption Environment
59
54
20
60
90.2
33.29
38.87
0.62
97.7
22.21
36.55
1
17.84
27.58
29.45
0.49
12
0.5
0.8
0
98.3

72.4
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78.14

1

GDP
60
6616.69
5855
3532.02
2006
13206.4
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